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SEWARD AND THE DECLARATION
OF PARIS.
The period between April 13, 186r, when Fort Sumter fell,
and July 2r, following, which witnessed the Bull Run catastrophe - a period of exactly one hundred days - constituted
the first distinctive stage of our Civil War. Formative, during
it the loyal portion of the Union was, so to speak, :finding itself. In an excited and altogether abnormal condition morally,
it was unreasoning, unreasonable and curiously illogical. As an
interval of time, therefore, the period referred to stands by
itself, to be treated separately from that which preceded or that
which was to follow. Before April 13th and up to that daystrange as the assertion now sounds - the historic fact is that
the country, taken as a whole, had no realizing sense of the impending. Though anxiety was great and continuallyincreasing,it
was still generally believed that, somehow or in some way, providential if not otherwise, an actual appeal to arms and a consequent internecine struggle would not take place. Too dreadful
calmly to contemplate, it could not, and consequently would not,
occur.1 The firing on Fort Sumter dispelled this illusion, and an
entire community at last realized the grim, hard facts of a
situation truly appalling. Then, so far as the part of the country loyal to the Union was concerned, there ensued the hundred
days referred to, - days of artificial excitement and selfdelusion. Fired by patriotism and literally drunk with enthusiasm, the North indulged in a most exaggerated self-confidence,
combined with an altogether undue depreciation of its opponent.
1 "Neither party appeared to be apprehensive of or to realize the gathering
storm. There was a general belief, indulged _in by most persons, that an adjust•
ment would in some way be brought about, without any extensive resort to extreme measures. . . . Until blood was spilled there was hope of conciliation."
Welles, Diary, 1. 10, 12, 35, 172, 355-356.
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The conflict was to be short, sharp and decisive. A military
walk-over was confidently anticipated; the so-called Confederacy was to be obliterated by one wild rush. The cry of "On
to Richmond," first raised by Horace Greeley in the New York
Tribune, soon became general and irresistible. But the delusion was not confined to the unthinking or less well-informed.
Shared to an almost equal extent by those in official position, it
was reflected in their attitude and stands recorded in their
utterances. This was peculiarly apparent in the management
of our foreign relations through the State Department, of which
Mr. Seward was the head. The awakening - and it was a
terribly rude one - came on the 21st of July, at Bull Run;
and from that day the struggle entered on a wholly new phase.
The community, at first panic-stricken, then soon sobered. The
strength and fighting capacity of the Confederacy had been
unmistakably demonstrated; and, the first artificial flush of
enthusiasm dispelled, the country addressed itself in a wholly
new spirit to the supreme effort to which it at last realized it
was summoned. The magnitude and consequent uncertainty
of the struggle were realized.
In the course of a somewhat elaborate historical study my
attention has recently been drawn to an altogether forgotten
diplomatic episode which occurred in that stage of initial
crystallization, and to it I propose to devote this paper. As
an incident in a most critical period, what I have to describe
will, I think, prove not without interest; and, at the time, it
was, .as I now view it, of a possible importance appreciated
neither then nor since.
I recently received a letter from our associate, Mr. Frederic
Bancroft, author of the Lije of Seward, ·in which, referring
to an allusion of mine, he said: "Unless you have taken stand
directly against your father and your brother Henry's essay
in regard to Seward's and your father's attitude toward the
attempted accession of the United States, in 186!, to the declaration of Paris of 1856, I very much wish to argue the point
with you, orally, of course."
The allusion recalled the fact, which I had quite forgotten,
that Mr. Henry Adams had prepared such a paper as 1.fr. Bancroft referred to,1 and, moreover, that I had myself nearly
1 Historical Essays, 237-28g.
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twenty years ago made large use of it in writing chapter XII
entitled "The Treaty of Paris," in the Life of C. F. Adams, in
the American Statesman Series. Mr. Bancroft had subsequently
gone over the same ground, but I could not recall the conclusions he had reached. In fact, the whole subject had passed
completely out of my memory. I accordingly once more reverted
to it, carefully re-reading Mr. Henry Adams's paper, the chapter (xxxr) relating to the episode in Mr. Bancroft's Seward,
and finally my own effort of a score of years since. The
general historians had not apparently deemed the incident
worthy even of passing notice. In this, as will presently be
seen, I do not concur.
As usual, the more thoroughly I now studied the records,
the more important, involved, and suggestive the episode became. Above all, I was amazed and mortified at the superficial character of my own previous treatment; for I now found
myself compelled to most unwelcome conclusions, not only
different from those I had previously set forth, but altogether
at variance with those reached by Mr. Henry Adams in his
carefully prepared study. Though peculiarly well-informed as
to the facts, having himself been practically at the time concerned in what occurred, I now found reason to conclude he
had written from the point of view of an active and interested
participant; and since he published his paper fresh material
had come to light. I so wrote at much length to Mr. Bancroft,
with whose subsequently prepared narrative and conclusions I
now find myself in more general, though not in complete,
accord. That letter to Mr. Bancroft supplies the basis of what
I here submit. In submitting it, however, I wish to premise
that in it no regard has been paid to the literary aspect, nor
can it even be considered a finished historical study. Rather
in the nature of a compendium or syllabus, into it I have
put a mass of somewhat heterogeneous matter with a view
to making the same more accessible in future to myself, as
well as other investigators of a highly interesting historical
period. I regard the result, therefore, largely as raw material,
in the accumulation and presenting of which I have to acknowledge much and efficient assistance received from our
Editor.
For an intelligent comprehension of what is to follow in its
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far-reaching significance and somewhat dramatic interest,
it is, however, necessary to go pretty far back, - so to speak,
to begin at the beginning. Attention has already been called
to the date of the bombardment and fall of Fort Sumter, April 13, 1861. Events then followed rapidly. Sumter was
surrendered on Saturday, and the papers of the following
Monday the 15th, contained the proclamation of the President calling for troops, and summoning Congress to meet July
4th in extra session.1 Two days later, the 17th, Jefferson Davis
responded from Montgomery by declaring the intention of the
Confederacy immediately to issue letters of marque, authorizing
depredations by privateers on the ships and commerce of the
loyal States.2 On the 19th, the Friday of the week following the
fall of Sumter, President Lincoln issued yet another proclamation announcing a blockade of the ports of all the seceding States.
In this proclamation it was stated that the blockade was to be
conducted "in pursuance of the laws of the United States and
of the law of nations in such case provided"; and, finally, to
meet the threatened retaliation through privateers and privateering, it was added "that if any person under the pretended
authority of such [Confederate] States .. . shall molest avessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her,
such person will be held amenable to the laws of the United
States for the prevention and punishment of piracy." 3 Two
international issues were thus presented and brought to the front
within the first week following the fall of Sumter. They were
the issues of belligerency in case of a blockade of the first magnitude, proclaimed to be enforced "in pursuance of the law of
nations," and the logically consequent issue naturally involved
in what is known as privateering. Five days later, on April
~4th, a circular addressed to the representatives of the United
States in all the principal capitals, was issued from the State
Department calling attention to the attitude now proposed to
be assumed by the United States towards what was known as
the Declaration of Paris.
This so-called Declaration was an outcome of the Crimean
War. When, in the summer of 1853, that war broke out, nearly
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VI. 13.
Messages a1id Papers of the Confederacy, r. 60.
• Messages and Papers of the Presuimts, VI. 14.

1
2
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forty years had elapsed since the close of the Napoleonic period:
a period during which, as is well known, a system of semi-barbarous rules of so-called international law had been ruthlessly
enforced by all belligerents. In r853 those rules were still
recognized as obligatory and enforceable, though in abeyance.
As an historical fact, it was undeniable that, on the high seas,
piracy was the natural condition of man; and, when the artificial state of peace ceased, into that condition as between those
involved in the strife nations relapsed. To ameliorate this state
of affairs, both possible and imminent, and to readjust in some
degree the rules of international law to meet changed commercial conditions, Great Britain and France, on the outbreak of
the war with Russia, agreed to respect neutral commerce,
whether under their own flags or that of Russia; and, at the
close of the war, the Congress of Paris adopted, in April, r856, a
D eclaration embracing four beads:
1 . Privateering is and remains abolished.
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of
war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag.
4. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective;
that is to say, maintained by forces sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.
Great Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, Austria and Turkey
adopted this mutual agreement, and pledged themselves to
make it known to States not represented in the Congress, and
invite their accession to it, on two conditions: (1) That
the Declaration should be accepted as a whole, or not at
all; and (2) That the States acceding should enter into no
subsequent arrangement on maritime law in time of war
without stipulating for a strict observance of the four points.
On these conditions every maritime power was to be invited
to accede, and had the right to become a party to the agreement. Accordingly nearly all the nations of Europe and
South America in course of time notified their accession,
and became, equally with the original parties contracting, entitled to all the benefits and subject to the obligations of the
compact.
Among the rest, the government of the United States was
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invited to accede, and, like the other powers, had the right
so to do by simple notification. This was during the Pierce
administration; and Mr. Marcy, then Secretary of State, in
due time (July 28, 1856) informed the governments interested
that the President could not abandon the right to have recourse
to privateers, unless he could secure the exemption of all private property, not contraband, from capture at sea; 1 with
that amendment the United States would become a party to
the Declaration.
In other words, in addition to the points agreed on at Paris
the United States contended for the establishment of the same
principle on the sea that obtained on land, to wit: the exemption from capture or unnecessary molestation of all private
property, not contraband of war, including ships. The last
great vestige of the earlier times of normal piracy was, by general consent, to be relegated to the past. With the exception
of Great Britain, the more considerable European maritime
powers made no objection to the Marcy amendment. For
obvious reasons connected with her past history and naval
preponderance, Gre1t Britain was understood to oppose it.
President Buchanan's was . essentially an "Ostend manifesto," or filibuster, administration. As such, it felt no call
to the proposed modifications; 2 but when Lincoln succeeded
1 [This policy goes back to 1823, when President Monroe recommended it in
his message of 1823. " I trust you will not take, as I am told some legislative
statesmen have done, the proposition mentioned in the message for abolishing
private war 1,po11 the sea to be a mere offer to abolish privateeri11g. You will
understand it as it is meant, a project for the universal exemption of private
property upon the ocean from depredation by war." Joh11 Q1'it1ey Ad~111S to
Robert Walsh, December 3, 1823. En.)
2 [The following has an historical interest in this connection.
September 5,
1861, Richard Cobden wrote to James Buchanan saying: "The subject of the
blockade is becoming more and more serious. I am afraid we have ourselves to
blame for not having placed the question of belligerent rights on a better footing."
He then asked a question about the attitude of the United States towards the
Declaration of Paris. Buchanan replied, December 14, 1861: "In reference to
your question in regard to blockade, no administration within the last half-century, up to the end of my term, would have consented to a general declaration
abolishing privateering. Our most effectual means of annoying a great naval
power upon the ocean is by granting letters of marque and reprisal. We could not
possibly, therefore, have consented to the Paris declaration which would have left
the vessels (for example of Great Britain or France) free to capture our merchant
vessels, whilst we should have deprived qurselves of the employment of the force
which had proved so powerful in capturing their merchant vessels. Hence the
proposition of Mr. Marcy to abolish war upon private property altogether on
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Buchanan the aspect of the proposition had, from the United
States point of view, undergone dramatic change. Threatened
with Confederate letters of marque, the government also found
itself engaged in, and responsible for, a blockade of the first
magnitude. Under such circumstances, it was plainly impossible
to forecast all contingencies, and it was very open to question
what policy might in certain exigencies prove the more expedient; but, on the whole, it seemed to the administration
wisest to endeavor to conciliate Europe.
The question immediately arises, What was intended by the
word "privateering" as used in the Declaration? On that
would seem, in the present case, to have depended the attitude
of the Diplomat at the time and the conch1.sions of the Historian since; for on this point strange confusion runs through all
the correspondence, memoirs and records. Nor is this confusion peculiar to our Civil War state papers and literature.
It is, on the contrary, very noticeable in the writings connected with our anterior wars, both that of Independence and
that of 1812- 1815. In the earlier cases it clearly existed in the
minds of those engaged in the discussion. In the case, however, of the Civil War, the confusion was apparently due in
quite as great a degree to a desire to ignore and confound
manifest and well-recognized distinctions as to any real lack
of a correct understanding of terms.
Up to the middle of the last (nineteenth) century, there were
various recognized forms of ocean depredation.1 Enumerating these in order, they were carried on
I. By pirates, so called, through what was known as "piracy." A familiar term, this calls for no definition.
2. By what were known as "corsairs."
3. By privateers, sailing in time of war under letters of
marque issued by a belligerent.
4. By regularly commissioned ships of war, belonging to a
recognized belligerent, under whose flag they sailed.
the ocean, as modern civilization had abolished it on the land." Works of James

Buchanan (Moore), XI. 2r8, 234. En.]

1
Throughout the preparation of this paper constant use has been made of
Prof. J. Bassett Moore's invaluable Digest of International Law (19o6), and especially of the collection of authorities and material under the two heads of
Privateers and the Declaration of Paris, vn. 535-583, secs. 1215- 1221. Only
in exceptional cases, therefore, is special reference made to this compendium.
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There has more recently come into existence a class of vessels
known as "commerce destroyers," constructed not for combat
primarily, but for the purpose of inflicting injury on the commercial marine of a hostile power with which the belligerent
owning the "commerce destroyer" is at war. The term, however, refers only to a type of naval construction. It in no way
affects legal classification. The "commerce destroyer" is
simply a public cruiser adapted to a specific purpose.
On these distinctions the whole issue depends. In the minds,
however, of those who carried on the negotiation of 1861, the
distinctions do not seem to have been clear; and the failure
then to observe, or the endeavor to ignore and obscure them,
complicated the whole diplomatic situation, and at more than
one juncture gravely threatened our foreign relations.
The ownership of the vessel sailing under a letter of marque
was, then, of the very essence of privateering. This, in 1861,
established the distinguishing line; and so lay at the basis of
Article I of the Declaration. The privateer thus held, •so to
speak, a betwixt-and-between position; a privately owned
maritime adventure, its letter of marque, issued by a belligerent, gave it a legal status. But for that it would have been
subject to treatment as a pirate. The distinction is, too, especially important to be borne in mind while discussing the problems which developed from the maritime operations conducted
during the Civil War, inasmuch as the value of the privateer,
and the inducement to "privateering," then depended on success in the capture of prizes; which prizes, when duly condemned, were to be the plunder, or property, of the individual
owner of the privateer. They did not, nor do they belong
to the Government that issued the letters of marque under
which the privateer sails. An individual venture, those concerned in the privateer were to a degree irresponsible. The
point was very elaborately discussed later in the War, by
Secretary Welles, in a series of letters addressed to Secretary
Seward, when it was proposed to issue letters of marque to
Union adventurers supposed to be anxious to chase the Confederate cruisers.1
The preservation of the prize, with a view to its condemnation as such, is, therefore, the great and essential inducement
1

Welles, Lincoln and Seward, 145-173; D-iary,

I.

246-262.
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to privateering. From mere commerce destruction the privateer gets no advantage. Thls it was, combined with the absence
of any open port where condemnation proceedings were possible, which almost at once put an end to the whole scheme of
Confederate privateering. The obvious fact that it must so do
was pointed out and emphasized by the first Confederate Commissioners - Yancey, Rost and Mann - as early as August
14, 1861, in their elaborate communication to Earl Russell of
that date. That Great Britain and France had closed their
ports to prizes of Confederate privateers sailing under letters
of marque, was in the following terms then made subject of
grave remark and implied remonstrance:
The undersigned, however, received with some surprise and regret, the avowal of Her Britannic Majesty's Government that in
order to the observance of a strict neutrality, the public and private
armed vessels of neither of the contending parties would be permitted
to enter Her Majesty's ports with prizes. The undersigned do not
contest the right of the British Government to make such regulations, but have been disposed to think that it has been unusual for
Her Majesty's Government to exercise such right, and that in this
instance the practical operation of the rule has been to favor the
Government at Washington, and to cripple the exercise of an undoubted public right of the Government of the Confederate States.
This Government commenced its career entirely without a navy.
Owing to the high sense of duty which distinguished the Southern
Officers, who were lately in commission in the United States Navy,
the ships which, otherwise, might have been brought into Southern
ports, were honorably delivered up to the United States Government,
and the Navy, built for the protection of the people of all the States,
is now used by the Government at Washington to coerce the people
and blockade the ports of one-third of the States of the late Union.
The people of the Confederate States are an agricultural and not a
manufacturing or commercial people. They own but few ships.
Hence there has not been the least necessity for the Government at
Washington to issue letters of marque. The people of the Confederate States have but few ships and not much commerce upon which
such private armed vessels could operate. The commodities produced in the Confederate States are such as the world needs more
than any other, and the nations of the Earth have heretofore sent
their ships to our wharves, and there the merchants buy and receive
our cotton and tobacco. But it is far otherwise with the people of
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the present United States. They are a manufacturing and commercial people. They do a large part of the carrying trade of the world.
Their ships and commerce afford them the sinews of war, and keep
their industry afloat. To cripple their industry and commerce; to
destroy their ships or cause them to be dismantled and tied up to
their rotting wharves, are legitimate objects and means of warfare.
Having no navy, no commercial marine, out of which to improvise
public armed vessels to any considerable extent, the Confederate
States were compelled to resort to the issuance of letters of marque,
a mode of warfare as fully and as clearly recognized by the law and
usage of nations, as any other arm of war; and most assuredly more
humane and more civilized in its practice than that which appears
to have distinguished the march of the troops of the Government
of the United States upon the soil and among the villages of Virginia. These facts tend to show that the practical working of the
rule that forbids the entry of the public and private armed vessels
of either party into British ports with prizes, operates exclusively to
prevent the exercise of this legitimate mode of warfare by the Confederate States, while it is to a great degree a practical protection
to the commerce and ships of the United States.

So much for privateers and privateering. A pirate, on the
other hand, is a common enemy of mankind. He sails under
no flag, and is responsible to no Government. A robber on the
high seas, he is simply an outlaw.1
The public announcement, immediately after the firing on
Sumter, that the Confederacy proposed to issue letters of
marque naturally caused great alarm to the Union authorities,
and the ship-owners of the loyal States. Under the conditions
prevailing in April, May and June, 1861, it well might. W. H.
Russell in his Diary gives a lively and picturesque account of
the state of_feeling then existing at Montgomery and of the
1 Almost every known term of opprobrium can be found in the Civil War
literature, official and private, applied to vessels sailing under the flag of the
Confederacy. They are thus not infrequently designated " corsairs." This
again was a misuse of terms; for, while a "corsair" is, strictly speaking,
a " pirate," the word in general acceptance signifies a description of piratical
craft long since passed out of existence. The corsair is especially associated with
the Barbary Powers, so called, and preyed upon foreign commerce not protected
by those powers; but vessels known as corsairs were, as a rule, commissioned
by the Barbary States, and sailed under their flags. They in a way constituted
a navy. The corsair passed out of existence about 1816 with the decay in power
of the Barbary States. The pirate was simply exterminated, like other outlaws, robbers and free-hooters. .
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views, knowledge and intentions of the Confederate authorities as respects letters of marque. What he then wrote did not
at the time appear in his letters published in the Times; and
that for obvious reasons. A neutral and a newspaper correspondent, he was under a well-understood obligation to disclose
nothing, not already public, which would give information or
contribute aid to the other party to the conflict. So in tb,e
London Times of May 30th, what is now about to be quoted
from the Diary, published eighteen months later, appeared
only in the following compressed and extremely non-committal
form: "On leaving the Secretary I proceeded to the room of the
Attorney-General, Mr. Benjamin, a very intelligent and able
man, whom I found busied in preparations connected with the
issue of letters of marque. Everything in the office looked like
earnest work and business."
Dates are here important as bearing on the conditions then
prevailing, and the consequent state of mind and feeling of
those upon whom rested the responsibility for action. The
brief extract just quoted appeared, it will be noticed, in the
issue of the London Times of May 30th. On the 6th and 9th of
the same month Russell was making in his Diary the following
more detailed record:
Mr. Benjamin (then acting as ~ttorney-General of the Confederacy] is the most open, frank, and cordial of the Confederates
whom I have yet met. I n a few seconds he was telling me all about
the course of Government with respect to privateers and letters of
marque and reprisal, in order probably to ascertain what were our
views in England on the subject. I observed it was likely the North
would not respect their flag, and would treat their privateers as
pirates. "We have an easy remedy for that. For any man under
our flag whom the authorities of the United States dare to execute,
we shall hang two of their people." "Suppose, Mr. AttorneyGeneral, England, or any of the great powers which decreed the
abolition of privateering, refuses to recognize your flag?" "We intend to claim, and do claim, the exercise of all the rights and privileges of an independent sovereign State, and any attempt to refuse
us the full measure of those rights would be an act of hostility to our
country." "But if England, for example, declared your privateers
were pirates?" "As the United States never admitted the principle
laid down at the Congress of Paris, neither have the Confederate
States. If England thinks :fit to declare privateers under our flag
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pirates, it would be nothing more or less than a declaration of war
against us, and we must meetit as best we can.". . . As I was going
down stairs, Mr. Browne called me into his room. He said that
the Attorney-General and himself were in a state of perplexity as
to the form in which letters of marque and reprisal should be made out.
They had consulted all the books they could get, but found no examples to suit their case, and he wished to know, as I was a barrister, whether I could aid him. I told him it was not so much my
regard to my own position as a neutral, as the vafri inscitia juris
which prevented me throwing any light on the subject. There are
not only Yankee ship-owners but English firms ready with sailors
and steamers for the Confederate Government, and the owner of
the Camilla might be tempted to part with his yacht by the offers
made to him. [Mr. Browne had three days before assured Lord
Russell thatJ the Government had already received numerous I think he said four hundred·- letters from ship-owners applying
for letters of marque and reprisal. Many of these applications were
from merchants in Boston, and other maritime cities in the New England States.1

In studying the history of what then occurred and the considerations which influenced the policy and utterances of those
responsible, as were Davis and Seward, for the course of events,
the foregoing is distinctly illuminating. It throws a penetrating light on a condition of affai11s now wholly matter of the past,
but one necessary to bear in mind if the course pursued by those
public characters is to be understood, much more if an historic
justice is to be meted out to them. The essential fact is, and
it is apparent from the foregoing extract, that in May, 1861,
J udah P. Benjamin on the one side, and W. H . Seward on the
other, took up a line of policy exactly where it had been dropped
on the conclusion of the treaty of Ghent, in December, 1814.
Confronted by a new and quite unforeseen situation, they in- .
sensibly reverted to the state of affairs which had existed half
a century before, and the methods adopted in dealing with it.
They failed, and most naturally failed, to grasp the fact that
nearly every condition had changed; and, consequently, they
had to grope their way somewhat blindly and altogether tentatively to a realizing sense of this fact. During the intervening
half-century steam had supplanted wind as the essential factor
in naval operations; and this fact, under the international con1,.

1

Russell, My Diary, North and SouJJi, chapters xxrr-xxm.

I

I

ditions which prevailed throughout our Civil War, set at naught
all the hopes and anticipations of Mr. Benjamin, and, had he
from the first fully realized what it implied, would have justified Mr. Seward in dismissing his apprehensions, so far as injury
from privateers was concerned. In other words, what Benjamin
hoped for ·and Seward feared was the fitting out at individual
cost in Confederate and neutral ports of a swarm of cruisers who
would in view of the illicit profits to be derived therefrom prey
on American commerce, repeating the experience of the wars
anterior to r8r5. It was this class of venture to which the first
article of the Declaration of P aris was meant to apply, - the
fitting out and maintenance on the sea of privately owned
cruisers sailing under letters of marque. It in no way applied
to vessels, whether commerce destroyers or others, built,
equipped, armed and commissioned by a recognized belligerent.
As a matter of fact, therefore, and under the international conditions maintained throughout our Civil War, the provision
of the Declaration of Paris inhibiting privateering, had it been
in force, would have proved inoperative; and it would have
proved inoperative simply because, contrary to the hopes and
expectations of Mr. Benjamin on the one side, and the fears
and apprehensions of Mr. Seward on the other, privateering,
within the meaning of the D eclaration of Paris, cut no figure.
Why it thus cut no figure is obvious. The British and
French proclamations of belligerency, and consequent neutrality,
of May 13 and J une ro, r86r, solved the difficulty and, though
undesignedly, solved it under the altogether novel maritime
conditions then existing in favor of the United States. Privateers sailing under letters of marque could then by the old and
established maritime usage be fitted out in either neutral or
Confederate ports, sailing therefrom. As matter of fact, however, both were practically closed. The last, the Confederate
ports, were closed by a blockade, made possible by steam, to
either the egress of armed vessels, whether public or private,
or the ingress of such vessels, or any prizes that might
be captured by them. So long, therefore, as the blockade
could be effectively maintained, or, in other words, so long as
the European naval powers did not actively intervene to put
an end to the ocean mastery of the Union, that source of danger
was sealed up. Practically, also, the neutral ports were equally
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closed; for not only was the fitting out of privateers, as also of
commissioned cruisers, in disregard of neutrality, and so illegal,
but if an evasion of the law was successful or even connived at,
the bringing in of prizes was forbidden. The entire inducement
and incentive to privateering, in the sense of the Declaration
of Paris, was thus cut off. So far as privateering, therefore,
is concerned, whether with the ports of the Confederacy or
neutral ports as a basis, everything depended on the blockade,
and the observance as respects prizes of foreign neutrality;
and on that neutrality, and its continual observance, the blockade itself was dependent. Consequently, everything in the
struggle from the outset, privateering of course included,
hinged on what is known as Sea Dominion.
So far, however, as the present study is concerned, the one
important result thus far reached is that, apparently, the first
article of the Declaration of Paris had, under conditions then
prevailing, so little practical application to maritime operations during the Civil War as to constitute in them but a negligible quantity. The Confederate commissioners in the extract
just given from their communication to the British Foreign
Secretary set forth the situation in terms of moderation when
they said that the Southern States were "neither a manufacturing nor a commercial people, . . . having no navy, no
commercial marine, out of which to improvise public armed
vessels to any considerable extent." Captain J. D. Bulloch,
the Confederate naval agent and representative in Europe
throughout the struggle, writing in 1883, stated the case far
more correctly. He said: "It was impossible to build armored
vessels in the Confederate States for operations on the coast;
- neither the materialsmor the mechanics were there; and besides, even if iron and skilled artisans had been within reach,
there was not a mill in the country to roll the plates, nor furnaces
and machinery to forge them, nor shops to make the engines." 1
Under such conditions the most the Confederacy could accomplish within itself was to construct rude :floating batteries,
propelled by most insufficient engines, and adapted to inlandwater operations both defensive and offensive, - vessels of the
type of the Virginia, at Norfolk, and the Tennessee, at Mobile,
in no way fit for ocean service. Nor were conditions more
:.
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favorable for the proper fitting out of a privateering fleet. Bulloch subsequently wrote: "It is quite safe for me to state that
at the beginning of the year 1861 there was not, within the whole
boundary of the Confederacy, a single private yard having the
plant necessary to build and equip a cruising ship of the most
moderate offensive capacity." 1
Under such conditions, domestic and foreign, Confederate
privateering within the meaning of the Declaration of Paris
died an early and natural death.2 As prizes could not, because
of the blockade, be sent into Confederate ports for purpose of
condemnation and sale, and as all foreign ports were closed to
them, the inducement ceased to exist. The record of Confederate privateering proper can, therefore, be briefly recounted.
Early in May, 1861, at the outset of troubles, a rumor got
abroad that an iron steamer, the Peerless, equipped on the
Great Lakes, had been bought by the Confederate Government, preparatory to being sent to sea to operate on American
commerce. Secretary Seward was at this time, as we now
know, in an irritable state of mind, and one decidedly aggressive. The course of domestic events was not going as he had
planned it should go; his position in the Cabinet was anomalous;
his leadership was challenged; his influence, as the natural result of frequent forecastings invariably proved mistaken in the
result, was plainly waning both in Washington and the country
at large. Temporarily, at any rate, his prestige was distinctly
impaired. Not unnaturally, also, his views at this stage of the
conflict as to the foreign policy best to be adopted under circumstances altogether unprecedented were, to say the least, inchoate.
So he, head of the Department of State, now sent a telegraphic
order to all naval officers of the United States to seize the Peerless" under any flag, and with any papers," if they had probable
information that she had been sold to agents of the Confederacy.
In consequence of a vigorous protest against such a high-handed
measure immediately filed by the British Minister, the Secretary,
however, the same day wrote to Lord Lyons that if the information on which action was taken "proved to be incorrect, full
satisfaction will be promptly given." 3 And even in this formal
1
1
3
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Parliamentary Paper, North America, No. 1, 1862, 31-33.
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paper the usual confusion of thought and expression was perceptible, for it was stated that the ship in question was rumored
to have been sold to the de facto insurgent government "to be
used as a privateer." There was a distinctly humorous element in the outcome of this initial episode, illustrative of the
way in which important public business was then transacted.
Lord Lyons in due time reported to Earl Russell, "It turned
out that the ship had all the time been purchased by the
United States government itself," and this purchase bad been
"the cause of proceedings of the vessel ·which were looked
upon as suspicious." 1
So far as my investigations enable me to form an opinion,
there is thus no case of a vessel actually going out from any
foreign port equipped as a privateer to sail under Confederate
letters of marque. I n every instance the vessel so equipped and
going to sea was the property of the Confederacy, commissioned
as such, and intended to perform the part of a modern commerce
destroyer.
The only privateers, properly so classified, which, sailing
under letters of marque, appeared upon the ocean and committed ravages on American commerce, were vessels equipped
very early in the war in Confederate ports, and sent to sea
therefrom. This phase of the struggle has been exhaustively
and satisfactorily treated by J. T. Scharf in his History of the
Confederate Navy.2 The author, also, therein draws the distinction already referred to:
A privateer, as the name imports, is a private armed ship, fitted
out at the owner's expense, but commissioned by a belligerent government to capture the ships and goods of the enemy at sea, or the
ships of neutrals when conveying to the enemy goods contraband of
1 Lyo11s to Russell, lb., II5. This was not the only or most important instance
in which, during the early weeks of the Lincoln administration, the functions of
the Navy Department were without consultation assumed by the Department of
State. In the Welles Diary (r. 23- 25) there is an interesting account of a similar
proceeding, leading at a most critical juncture to consequences of far greater
moment. Secretary Welles, probably with undue severity, subsequently wrote
(Diary, I. 204) of Mr. Seward: "He gets behind me, tampers with my subordinates, and interferes injuriously and ignorantly in naval matters, not so much
from wrong purposes, but as a busybody by nature. I have not made these
matters subjects of complaint outside and think it partly the result of usage and
practice at Albany." See, also, lb., n. 160.
• Chapter rv. 53""93· Second edition. 1894.

19
war. A privateer differs from a pirate in this, that the one has a
commission and the other has none. A privateer is entitled to the
same rights of war as the public vessels of the belligerent. A pirate
ship has no rights, and her crew are liable to be captured and put
to death by all nations, as robbers and murderers on the high seas. i

In examining the list in this book given of vessels :fitted out
and sailing from Confederate ports under letters of marque
during the first summer of the War, it is curious to observe how
closely the traditions of 18r2-r8r5 were followed. The vessels
were in greatest part mere schooners, hastily equipped and
insufficiently armed. Fifty years behind the times, and relying solely on canvas, they were at the mercy of ships propelled by steam. The following is, for instance, an individual
experience:

The revenue cutter Aiken, which had been seized in Charleston
by the authorities of South Carolina before the firing on Fort Sumter,
was fitted out as a privateer, and called the Petrel, and placed under
the command of Capt. Wm. Perry. On July 27th the privateer
schooner sailed out of Charleston, and stood for the U. S. frigate
St. Lawrence, which she mistook for a merchantman, as all her ports
were closed. When the Petrel got within range she fired three shots
without doing any damage. The St. Lawrence returned with shot
and shell a terrific fire, one shell exploding in the hull of the Petrel,
and sinking her instantly. The boats of the frigate were lowered, and
picked up thirty-six out of forty of the privateer's crew, who were
taken aboard, and their feet and hands heavily manacled. The
remaining four were drowned.1
During the first months of the war, and before the blockade
became really effective, quite a number of these privateers got
to sea, and some of their captures - sent into Confederate
ports - were there duly condemned and sold. Others were
released after being bonded; but the greatest number of vessels captured were scuttled and otherwise destroyed. The
injury thus sustained by the United States merchant marine
was undoubtedly considerable, but in largest part due to the
alarm occasioned, and the immediate consequent transfer of
American shipping to foreign ownership. As the war progressed
and the blockade became more effective, conditions produced
1
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their natural results. P rivateering was abandoned as both
perilous and unprofitable, and the maritime activity and spirit
of adventure of the Confederacy turned in the direction of
blockade running as at once less dangerous and far more remunerative. Privateering within the scope of Article I of the
Treaty of Paris may, therefore, be said to have ceased to be a
factor in the operations of the Civil War by the close of 1861.1
Premising these distinctions, principles and facts, it is now
proper to return to the narrative and the sequence of events.
The British proclamation of belligerency, as it is called, or
more properly the proclamation of neutrality in the conflict
which had developed, with the recognition of a belligerent
character in both parties thereto, was made public in London
during the week (May 15, r86I) following Mr. Russell's visit
at the office of Attorney-General Benjamin, at Montgomery;
and Secretary Seward was simultaneously formulating a policy,
the circular in relation to the accession of the United States to
the Declaration of P aris having been sent out on the 24th of
April, or some three weeks before.
In the interim had occurred the tumultuous popular uprising
of the Joyal States consequent upon the attack on Sumter. The
stage of incertitude and resulting panic had.I passed away,
troops, such as they were, were pouring into Washington, and
the country was well entered on the intermediate, over-confident
and self-inflated stage of the conflict referred to in the earlier
portion of this paper. Secretary Seward shared to the full in
1 " I n the Civil War . . . the rebel government offered its letters of marque;
but, as nearly all the maritime powers had warned their subjects that if they
served in privateers in the war, their governments would not interfere to protect
them, and as the United States had threatened to treat such persons as pirates,
and the naval power of the United States was formidable, no avowedly foreign
private armed vessels took letters of marque; and the ostensibly Confederate vessels were commissioned as of its regular navy." Dana, Wheaton, 45611.
"One popular error pervades all which has been said or written, on both sides of
the line, about the Confederate navy. This is the general title of 'privateer'
given to all vessels not cooped up in southern harbors. . . . There was a law
passed, regulating the issue of letters of marque; and from time to time much
was heard of these in the South. But [with the exception of the) 'Jeff Davis'
not more than two or three ever found their way to sea, and even these accomplished nothing. At one time, a company with heavy capital was gotten up in
Richmond, for the promotion of such enterprises; but it was looked upon as a
job and was little successful in any sense." De Leon, Four Years in Rebel
Capitals, 262.
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these feelings, and that he did so was manifest both in his
utterances and his official despatches. Acting, it would appear,
under the impulse of the moment, and without sufficiently informing himself as to the character of the action taken by the
British Government, or the consequences to be apprehended
therefrom, Mr. Seward not only now assumed high ground, but
the ground by him taken could by no possibility be maintained
unless the most sanguine anticipations of the Union authorities
were fulfilled in the immediate future, those anticipations in no
way making provision for an unexpected adverse catastrophe.
Accordingly, the Secretary (May 17th) set to work drafting
what he while engaged upon it described in a familiar letter to
a member of his family as a "bold remonstrance before it is too
late." 1 His remonstrance took the form of the despatch No. 10
of May 21st, addressed to Mr. Adams.2 It is unnecessary for
present purposes to refer to it in detail. I t is sufficient to say
that upon its receipt and first perusal Mr. Adams wrote in his
Diary: "The Government seems almost ready to declare war
with all the powers of Europe, and almost instructs me to withdraw from communication with the ministers here in a certain
contingency. . . . I scarcely know how to understand Mr.
Seward. The rest of the Government may be demented for all
I know; but he surely is calm and wise. My duty here is in
so far as I can do it honestly to prevent the irritation from
coming to a downright quarrel. It seems to me like throwing
the game into the hands of the enemy." 3 In the despatch referred to the Secretary, in addition to the suppression of domesSeward at Washington, rr. 575-576.
The general tenor of this despatch was known at the time to Lord Lyons.
He wrote concerning it to Lord John Russell, under date of May 23d, as follows:
"Upon receiving the intelligence of your Lordship's declaration in Parliament,
Mr. Seward drew up a despatch to Mr. Adams to be communicated to your Lordship in terms still stronger than any he had before used. I fear that the President
has consented to its being sent, on condition, however, that it is to be left to Mr.
Adams's discretion to communicate it or not, as he may think advisable. If
sent, it will probably reach London about the same time with this despatch."
(Parliame,itary Paper, 1862, 39.) This despatch reached the Foreign Office
June 4th; the despatch referred to in it did not reach the Legation in London
until six days later, June 10th. See also Parliamentary Papw (1862), n5, where,
just at the crisis of the Trent affair (December 25, 1861), the attention of Earl
Russell is called by Lord Lyons to Mr. Seward's despatch of May 21, then just
made public in the printed diplomatic correspondence accompanying the message
of the President.
1 Ms. Diary, Monday, June 10, 1861.
1
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tic insurrection, contemplated as possible if not immediately
impending, a war "between the United States and one, two, or
even more European nations," - a conflict of which he now
wrote to his wife, "it will be dreadful, but the end will be sure
and swift." The despatch was, in fact, a general defiance thrown
forth to governments throughout the world, whether avowedly
unfriendly or assumed to be so ! 1
In this despatch as originally drawn and submitted to the
President, the Secretary, reflecting the mood and expectations
of the hour, among much else observed that "after long forbearance, designed to soothe discontent and avert the need
of civil war, the land and naval forces of the United States
have been put in motion to repress the insurrection. The
true character of the pretended new State is at once revealed.
It is seen to be a Power existing in pronunciamento only." 2
In preparing this puzzling,• if not. now well-nigh incomprehensible state paper, couched in language plainly calculated to
1 During the earlier portions of the Lincoln administration, largely through th e
influence of the Secretary of State, no regular Cabinet meetings were held. Mr.
Welles asserts in his Diary (r. 138) that "Many of the important measures, particularly of his own Department, (Mr. Seward] managed to dispose of or contrived
to have determined independent of the Cabinet." See also lb., I. 134, 154, 203,
274. So far as anywhere appears, this course was followed with respect to the
despatch of May 21. It was never submitted to the Cabinet, and, while rumors
of its purport were current, k.nowledge of its details seems at the time to have
been con.fined to the Secretary, Mr. Lincoln, and Mr. Sumner, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, who was consulted by the President in
regard to it. No reference to what then occurred is found in Pierce's Life of
Smnner. A year later, however, when a concerted move was made by the Republican Senators to bring about the dismissal of Secretary Seward from the
Cabinet, much emphasis was laid upon this despatch, portions of which had been
published in the Diplomatic Correspondence of the previous year. In his Diary
Secretary Welles says that during the discussion which took place, December 20,
1862, between the committee of nine Senators and the President and members
of his Cabinet, the volume of Diplomatic Correspondmce was alluded to; "some
letters denounced as unwise and impolitic were specified, one of which, a confidential despatch to Mr. Adams, was read. If it was unwise to write, it was
certainly injudicious and indiscreet to publish such a document." (Diary, r.
198; Lincoln and Seward, 76.) The Secretary of State was at this time very
generally accused of transmitting despatches of importance to the foreign representatives without previously submitting them to the President. A case in
point was developed at this conference, Mr. Lincoln expressing great surprise
when his attention was called by Senator Sumner to a certain despatch in the
printed Diplomatic Correspondence (that to Mr. Adams, J uly 5, 1862), disclaiming
any knowledge of it. Pierce, rv. ru.
2
•
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provoke and precipitate a foreign cns1s, one thing only is
obvious, - the Secretary of State was, in plain English, discounting. a wholly successful outcome of the movements of the
land and naval forces of the United States then preparing to be
put in immediate "motion to repress the insurrection." So
much is manifest. What, however, was !implied by the observation in the paragraph immediately succeeding that from
which the extract just given is quoted, is less apparent. The
Secretary went on to assert that in certain contingencies then
regarded as of more than probable occurrence "the laws of
nations afford an adequate and proper remedy, and we shall
avail ourselves of it ." Clearly a threat, what that threat signified is still matter of in,ference.
Though a lawyer by calling, and as such in a way eminent,
Mr. Seward did not possess what is known as a legal mind, much
less one of judicial cast. Long retired from active practice, he
had never given any particular attention to the problems and
collection of usages which make up the body of what is denominated International Law. He now also freely admitted to his
Cabinet colleagues that, though almost daily called upon to
deal with novel and intricate international issues, he never
opened the treatises, and "that he was too old to study." One
of his associates (Blair) did not hesitate to say that in his
opinion the Secretary of State knew "less of public law than
any man who ever held a seat in the Cabinet"; while another
(Welles) put on record his surprise to find him "so little acquainted with the books," 1 and a third (Bates) pronounced him
"no lawyer and no statesman." 2 Sumner, whose own conceptions of international usage were distinctly nebulous, averred
that Seward knew nothing of it; and apparently without consulting so familiar an authority as Wheaton, the Secretary of State
1

Allowance must always be made in case of statements found in the Welles

Diary as respects Mr. Seward. Referring, however, to his lack of acquaintance

with the principles of international law, Mr. Welles wrote as follows, under a date
as late as January 30, 1865: "He told me last week that he had looked in no book
on international law or admiralty law since he entered on the duties of his present
office. His thoughts, he says, come to the same conclusions as the writers and
students. This he has said to me more than once. In administrating the government he seems to have little idea of constitutional and legal restraints, but acts
as if the ruler was omnipotent. Hence he has involved himself in constant difficulties." Diary, n. 232.
1
Welles, Diary, 1. 170, 233, 275, 285; n. 93.
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depended for his conclusions on the chief clerk of the Department and a few unofficial advisers of questionable authority.1
What, however, Mr. Seward now distinctly implied, was that,
should Great Britain give shelter from our pursuit and punishment to those whom !she declared "lawful belligerents," but
who being our citizens we adjudged to be "pirates,'' the law
of nations would justify the United States in pursuing such
miscreants into neutral harbors and there destroying them.
T he proposition was certainly "bold,'' - not to say startling.2
1 "[Seward) has, with all his bustle and activity, but little application; relies
on Hunter and his clerk, Smith, .. . to sustain him and hunt up his authorities." Welles, Diary, r. 275. "Whiting, Solicitor of the War Department, has
gone to Europe. Is sent out by Seward, I suppose. . . . [William Whiting is]
such a man as Stanton would select and Seward use." lb., 381, 544; n. 85.
William Whiting then occupied the position of solicitor of the War Department..
Caleb Cushing, whose loyalty at this time was not above suspicion, also seems
to have been an unofficial adviser. lb., r. 275.
2 This would seem to be the unavoidable inference to be drawn from the despatches of Secretary Seward connected with events of subsequent occurrence.
On the night of October 6, 1864, the Confederate cruiser Florida was run down
by the United States cruiser Wach11selt in the harbor of Bahia, Brazil, and subsequently towed out to sea and carried to Hampton Roads, as prize. In this case
there was no controversy as to facts. The whole proceeding was high-handed, and
in manifest violation of recognized principles of international law. As such it led
to formal representations on behalf of Brazil to which Secretary Seward replied
under date of December 20, 1864. The correspondence can be fow1d in the
"British Case" prepared for the Geneva Arbitration (75-78) and in Bulloch's
Secru Seroice of lite ConftderaJe Sia/es i1i E11rope (1. 199-224). In his reply to the
reclamation of tile Brazilian Minister Secretary Seward then wrote tllat tile
Florida, "like the Alabama, was a pirate, belonging to no nation or lawful belligerent, and therefore that the harbouring and supplying of these piratical ships
and their crews in Brazilian ports were wrongs and injuries for which Brazil
justly owes reparation to the United States." The Secretary further denied that
the "insurgents of this country are a lawful naval belligerent; and, on the contrary, it maintains that the ascription of that character by the Government of
Brazil to insurgent citizens of tile United States, who have hitherto been, and
who still are, destitute of naval forces, ports, and courts, is an act of intervention
in derogation of the law of nations, and unfriendly and wrongful, as it is manifestly injurious, to the United States."
In the preceding year, in a despatch from Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams (Diplomatic Correspo11de11ce, 1863, Part I. 3cxr310) relating to the recent decision in
the case of tile Alexa11dra, Mr. Seward wrote as follows: "If the law of Great
Britain must be left without amendment, and be construed by the government in
conformity with the rulings of the chief baron of the exchequer, then there will be
left for the United States no alternative but to protect themelves and their commerce against armed cruisers proceeding from British ports, as against the naval
forces of a public enemy; and also to claim and insist upon indemnities for the injUiies which all such expeditions have hitherto committed or shall hereafter
commit against this government and the citizens of the United States. To this

Coming, however, to the final paragraph in the extracts
from the despatch of May 21st- that relating to the Treaty
of Paris - it will be noted that the Secretary referred to it as
" abolishing privateering everywhere in all cases and forever";
he then went on as follows: "You already have our authority
to propose to [Great Britain] our accession to that declaration. If she refuse to receive it, it can only be because she is
willing to become the patron of privateering when aimed at
our devastation." 1
We now come to the true inwardness of the present discussion. What did Seward mean by this language? What was
he driving at? Did he speak in good faith? - or did he have
an ulterior and undisclosed end always in view, that end to be
attained by indirection? The study becomes interesting, for
it is necessarily made from the dramatis personae point of view.
It involves the correct reading of the individual character of
eminent men at a very critical period historically. What then
was Seward proposing to himself? What considerations actuend th.is government is now preparing a naval force with the utmost vigor; and if
the national navy, which it is rapidly creating, shall not be sufficient for the
emergency, then the United States must bring into employment such private
armed na,·al forces as the mercantile marine shall afford. . . . Can it be an occasion for either surprise or complaint that if this condition or tb.in,,as is to remain
and receive the deliberate sanction o[ the British government, the navy o[ the
United States will receive instructions to pursue these enemies into the ports
which thus, in violation or the law or nations and the obligations of neutrality,
become harbors for the pirates?" In connection with these e.,:tracts it should be
observed that the first- that relating to the Florida - occurred at the close of
December, 1864, when the Civil War was rapidly drawing to a close. The correspondence, in this case, was submitted to the Cabinet, and the despatch to the
Brazilian minister was approved (Welles, Diary, n. 184-186, 197). There is no
evidence that the previous despatch to Mr. Adams, of July u, 18631 was submitted to the Cabinet or had been approved by the President before transmission.
It was not communicated by Mr. Adams to Earl Russell; and when it subsequently appeared in the United States Diplomatic Corresp,ndence, "a storm was
raised in the House of Commons. This was not calmed until Earl Russell claimed
that as the despatch had never been laid before him, he had been spared Lhe difficulty and pain of giving an appropriate answer to it." (Bancroft, Seward, 11.
390.) While the Secretary naturally hesitated to advance such a claim as an
accepted principle of international law, he seems not to have been unwilling
vaguely to imply as much, venturing on no specific proposition. T he threat of
a recourse to privateering in certain contingencies which must inevitably have
ensued had the action taken by the W achusett been ventured upon under instructions in British waters, was expressed in language which could not be termed
even diplomaticall_.Y veiled.
1
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ated Earl Russell in the course he was presently to take? How
did Mr. Adams, Lord Lyons and Mr. Dayton, who bore the
subordinate parts in the drama, demean themselves?
Seward is primarily to be considered and disposed of. His
was the leading part. He had in the first place announced that
dealing with the privateers sailing under Confederate letters
of marque was a matter within the exclusive prerogative of the
United States, the Confederacy then (May 21st) not being a
recognized belligerent; and the United States proposed, by
virtue of its municipal law, to treat the privateers as pirates.
Seward's scheme unquestionably was, by an adroit though
somewhat transparent move on the diplomatic chess-board, to
force the neutral maritime powers into a position inconsistent
with the law, -whether international or of humanity; that is,
he proposed by giving notice as prescribed to secure the accession of this country to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris
under which privateering was abolished, and then the United
States was, as the sole recognized sovereign nationality, to demand of the Powers that "privateering [being] everywhere and
in all cases and forever" abolished, the Powers must refuse
access to their ports to the Confederate "pirates," as he
designated them. Thus reducing them into the class of criminals or outlaws, - as such to be summarily dealt with.
Such was Seward's scheme, as it first assumed shape in his
mind.
Yet, again, the matter of dates now becomes important.
Seward took the initial step leading to this position April 24th,
- twelve days only after the attack on Sumter. He then notified the proposed accession of the United States to the Declaration of Paris. The Confederacy had not up to that time anywhere been recognized as a belligerent; and, that being the case,
Seward assumed that the United States, being the "exclusive
sovereign," rightfully and as of course spoke internationally
for the so-called Confederacy as well as for itself.
Unfortunately for the practical working of this theory,
Great Britain and France, acting in co-operation at this juncture, recognized the Confederacy as a belligerent; and then,
under all accepted rules of international law, the new belligerent had a right to carry on its operations on water as on land.
Here was a new and somewhat irritating as well as extremely
j

perplexing issue; and again Seward took high ground. As foreshadowed in his despatch No. 10, he now insisted that the Confederacy was not a belligerent in any full sense of the term until
acknowledged as such by the sovereign power of the United
States. Writing to Mr. Dayton at this time Mr. Seward thus
expressed himself, in a despatch marked "strictly confidential":
' You seem to us to have adopted the idea that the insurgents are
necessarily a belligerent power because the British and French Governments have chosen in some of their public papers to say that they
are so. . . . Our view is on the contrary. . . . We do not admit,
and we shall never admit, even the fundamental statement you assume, namely, that Great Britain and France have recognized the
insurgents as a belligerent party. True, you say that they have so
declared. We reply: Yes, but they have not declared so to us. You
may rejoin: Their public declaration concludes the fact. We nevertheless reply: It must be not their declarations, but their action
that shall conclude the fact. That action does not yet appear, and
we trust, for the sake of harmony with them and peace throughout
the world, that it_will not happen.1
Accordingly, he vaguely claimed that the United States,
not acknowledging the Confederacy as a belligerent, could
treat as it saw fit vessels commissioned by the Montgomery
government as privateers; and, privateers being abolished by
the Declaration of Paris, they consequently became pirates.
Having thus fixed their status, he further distinctly intimated
an intention to claim that they could be pursued into neutral
ports, and there destroyed as common enemies of mankind.2
Such was apparently the line of procedure somewhat vaguely
formulated in Seward's mind; the ultimate step of which he
held in reserve throughout what are known as the negotiations
relating to the Declaration of Paris, now gravely entered upon.
Moore, International Law Digest, vn. 574.
In the case of the Florida the commander of the W a,husett had acted on his
own responsibility. His proceeding was therefore disavowed with expressions of
regret; and this was to be regarded as "ample reparation" in view of "the enduring sense of injuries" entertained by the United States. Had, however, the
violation of neutrality taken place by order under the conditions set forth in the
despatch to Mr. Adams of July II, 1863, the law of nations "afforded an adequate
and proper remedy," that remedy being apparently an offer of ample though
formal reparation, accompanied, of course, in proper cases, by a suitable money
indemnity. See, also, Welles, Diary, n. 185, 197.
1
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So much for Secretary Seward. It is now necessary to
turn to the other parties to that negotiation; and first, Earl
Russell.
In the earliest of the discussions which took place in the
Commons (May 21 1861) after the firing on Sumter, Lord John
Russell, as he then was, used the striking expression that Great
Britain had nothing to do with the American troubles, and
added, "For God's sake, let us, if possible, keep out of them!"
As a statement of fact also, and proposition of international
usage, Lord John Russell stood on firm ground when he further
at this juncture said in the Commons: "a power or a community
(call it which you will) which [is] at war:with another, and which
[coversl the sea with its cruisers, must either be acknowledged
as a belligerent, or dealt with as a pirate." 1 The issue was clear
and made up. President Lincoln had by proclamation announced that those captured on Confederate cruisers or privateers were to be dealt with as pirates. These utterances of
Lord John clearly foreshadowed the position of neutrality the
British Government, of which he was in this matter the mouthpiece, proposed to assume. That Government was, however,
most distrustful of Secretary Seward personally. Those composing it very generally suspected that he intended to excite
some grave foreign complication in order to bring about a
domestic reconciliation. With this possibility in mind, Lord
John Russell had written to Lord Lyons as long before as February 20th, as follows: "Supposing, however, that Mr. Lincoln, acting under bad advice, should endeavor to provide
excitement for the public mind by raising questions with Great
Britain, Her Majesty's Government feel no hesitation as to the
policy they would pursue. . . . They would take care to let
the Government which multiplied provocations and sought for
quarrels understand that their forbearance sprung from the consciousness of strength and not from the timidity of weakness."
The British Secretary did not err in this surmise. The idea
of a foreign complication as a counter-irritant was, as we now
know, distinctly in Seward's mind, even at that early date
(February, 1861). Philosophizing on this problem in the
measured language characteristic of his writings, Mr. Rhodes
says of the Secretary's mental condition four months later:
1
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The infatuation of Seward is hard to understand; it shows that
the notion which had prompted the "Thoughts for the President's
Consideration" still lodged in his brain, and that he dreamed that
if the United States made war on England because she helped the
Confederacy, the Southerners, by some occult emotional change,
would sink their animosity to the North, and join with it for the sake
of overcoming the traditional enemy. His unconcern at the prospect
of serious trouble with England was not courage, but a recklessness
which made him oblivious of what all discerning Northern statesmen
knew - that the people devoted to the Union had undertaken quite
enough, in their endeavor to preserve the nation from destruction by
its internal foes. 1
I n other words, Seward seems to have shared to the full in the
condition of mental intoxication in which the loyal North indulged during the hundred days between Sumter and Bull
Run. The distrust of him, therefore, privately entertained at
that time in diplomatic circles and the departments of
foreign affairs was well founded; far more so than was generally known, or in America even surmised until the NicolayHay revelations of t wenty years later. Lord Lyons, however,
at once advised Earl Russell of Seward's scheme in the
Declaration of Paris move. In a despatch dated June ·4th,
and received in London J une 14th, he wrote:
"It is probable that Mr. Adams may, before this despatch reaches
your Lordship, have offered, on the part of this Government, to adhere to Art. 1 of the Declaration~of Pans as well as to the others and
thus to declare privateering to be abolished. There is no doubt that
this adherence will be offered in the expectation that it will bind the
Governments accepting it to treat the privateers of the Southern
Confederacy as pirates. . . . At the present moment, however, the
privateers are in full activity, and have met with considerable success. It is not, therefore, to be expected that the Southern Confederacy will relinquish the employment of them, otherwise than on
compulsion or in return for some great concession from France and
England." He further added this caution: "It seems to me to be
far from certain that the United States Congress would ratify the
abolition of privateering; nor do I suppose that the Cabinet will abide
by its proposal when it finds that it will gain nothing towards the
suppression of the Southern privateering by doing so."
1

Rhodes, m. 424.

The ultimate purpose of Seward's move on the international
chess-board was, therefore, understood in the British Foreign
Office; and, of course, Earl Russell did not propose to be
unwittingly a victim of it. Accordingly, under date of July
12, 1861, he was thus writing to Edward Everett in Boston,
knowing well that the latter was in correspondence with Mr.
Adams in London:
" I respect the unanimous feeling of the North, and still more the
resolution not to permit the extension of Slavery which led to the
election of President Lincoln. But with regard to our own course
I must say something more. There were according to your account
eight millions of freemen in the Slave States. Of these millions upwards of five have been for some time in open revolt against the
President and Congress of the United States. It is not our practice
to treat five millions of freemen as pirates, and to hang their sailors
if they stop our merchantmen. But unless we meant to treat them
as pirates and to hang them, we could not deny them belligerent
rights. This is what you and we did in the case of the South American
Colonies of Spain. Your own President and Courts of Law decided
this question in the case of Venezuela.1
1

it1gs,

Adams Mss.
XLV, 76, 77•

Enclosure in ETJerelt to Adams, August

20,

1861.

Proced-

[In view o( the correspondence which is known to have passed between the
Premier and the Editor of the Times just prior to the Trent affair, four months
later, it is safe to assume that theTimes was at this juncture directly inspired from
Government sources. In its editorial columns of the issue o( May 15th, the
following comment appeared on the Proclamation o( Belligerency, then just
published:
"The North sees in the Southern States rebels against its authority, and will
probably, at first at least, decline to recognize the validity of Letters of Marque
issued under the authority of President Jefferson Davis. The South will not be
slow to retaliate, and it may easily J:>e anticipated that there will be a disposition
on both sides to treat those crews of privateers who may fall into their hands as
pirates, to whom the license they bear gives no protection. What would be the
conduct o( the British Government under such circumstances? Suppose an
Englishman taken on board a Southern privateer to be hanged under a sentence
of a Court of Admiralty at New York, - what would be the conduct of the Govern.ment in this country? The answer of the Proclamation to the question is by
no means encouraging. Persons eolistin~ in such service will do so at their peril
and of their own wrong, and will in no W1se obtain any protection from us against
any liabilities or penal consequences. It will be observed that in this place the
word 'such' is omitted. The liabilities and penal consequences are not confined
to those under the Act or under the law of nations, but are left wide and undefined, as if on purpose to impress the very case we are supposing. . . • We have
done our duty if we distinctly point out that those Englishmen who, in defiance
of the laws of their country and the solemn warnings of their Sovereign, rush into
this execrable conflict will do so with direct notice that if they meet with enemies
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Meanwhile, Seward, by what has always, for some reason not
at once apparent, passed for a very astute proceeding,1 caused
a transfer of the whole negotiation from Washington to London
and Paris, - that is, he refused to see the representatives of
France and Great Britain together, and under instructions acting jointly in reference to the accession of the United States
to the Declaration of Paris; and by so doing caused the negotiations to pass out of his own hands into those of his
two representatives in Europe, Mr. Adams and Mr. Dayton.2
They, J uly 6th, were instructed accordingly, and proceeded to
negotiate.
D ates and conditions must again be borne in mind. The
instmctions to negotiate on the basis of the treaty of Paris
"pure and simple," bore date of J uly 6th, just fifteen days
before the battle of Bull Run, and when the movement which
led to that disaster was fully decided upon and in active preparation. So far as foreign relations were concerned, Seward was
as reckless and merciless as themselves, they must bear the fate that awaits them,
without any hope that the country whose laws they have broken will stretch forth
her arm to shield them from the consequences of their own folly and wickedness.
. . . The warning has been given in time; we hope and believe that it will pro,·e
effectual, and that the horrors of a civil war between brethren will not be aggravated by the uncalled-for intervention of the subjects of the parent State."

It would thus appear that from the commencement Great Britain was upon its
guard. Under the circumstances, it was not proposed to protect British subjects
therein concerned in case privateering was visited with the penalty of piracy. On
the other hand, the British Government did not propose, through a deferred adhesion to the Treaty of Paris by the United States, to be drawn into a denial of
right of asylum to a recognized belligerent. Eo.J
1 Se-.vard at Washitigt1m, n. 581; Bancroft, Se-JH1rd, n. 181.
1 "Mr. Seward said at once that he could not receive from us a communication founded on the assumption that the Southern rebels were to be regarded as
belligerents; that this was a determination to which the Cabinet had come deliberately; that he could not admit that recent e,·eots had in any respect altered the
relations between foreign Powers and the Southern States; that he would not
discuss the question with us, but that he should give instructions to the United
States Ministers in London and Paris, who would be thus enabled to state the
reasons for the course taken by their Government to your Lordship and to M.
Thouvenel, if you should be desirous to hear them.
"'That is to say,' observed M. Mercier, 'you prefer to treat the question in
Paris and London rather than with us here.'
"'Just so,' said }Ir. Seward; and he proceeded to tell us that he should be
very much obliged if we would, on our side, leave with him, for his own use only,
our instructions, in order that he might be able to write his despatches to London
and Paris with a certainty that he did not misapprehend the views of our Governments." wd Lyons to DJTd John Russell, J une 17, 1861.
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then still riding a very high horse, - the No. 10 charger, in
fact, he had mounted on the 21st of the previous May. We
get a vivid and exceedingly life-like glin1pse of him, his attitude
and way of talking at just this juncture through Russell's
Diary. The Times special correspondent there describes how
on July 4th-while the despatches ordering the Declaration of
Paris negotiations to proceed were yet on Mr. Seward's table,
to go out two days later - he (Russell) called at the Department of State. He reports the impression in the course of that
interview made on him by Seward, recording his language
thus :
"We are dealing with an insurrection within our own country, of
our own people, and the Government of Great Britain have thought
fit to recognize that insurrection before we were able to bring the
strength of the Union to bear against it, by conceding to it the status
of belligerent. Although we might justly complain of such an unfriendly act in a manner that might injure the friendly relations between the two countries, we do not desire to give any excuse for
foreign interference; although we do not hesitate, in case of necessity,
to resist it to the uttermost, we have less to fear from a foreign war
than any country in the world. If any European Power provokes a
war, we shall not shrink from it. A contest between Great Britain
and the United States would wrap the world in fire, and at the end
it would not be the United States which would have to lament the
results of the conflict."
I could not but admire the confidence - may I say the coolness?
- of the statesman who sat in his modest little room within the sound
of the enemy's guns, in a capital menaced by their forces who spoke
so fearlessly of war with a Power which could have blotted out the
paper blockade of the Southern ports and coast in a few hours, and,
in conjunction with the Southern armies, have repeated the occupation and destruction of the capital.
To the historical investigator of 1912 the foregoing account
of a familiar talk with Secretary Seward in July, 1861 1 just a
fortnight before the disaster at Bull Run, is distinctly suggestive; as also is Russell's comment on what then passed. To
us who, seeing before and after, look back on the situation at
that period, it is curious to consider what possibilities were in
the mind of Secretary Seward when he thus, speaking for the
United States, calmly contemplated the contingency of a war
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with the two leading naval powers of Europe, imposed upon
the somewhat gigantic task of suppressing a domestic insurrection in which eleven distinct political communities were concerned, representing eight millions of population. We now
know, and it would seem as if Secretary Seward could at the
time hardly have failed to realize, that the task of suppressing
the insurrection alone taxed to the utmost both the strength
and the spirit of persistence of that portion of the United States
which remained loyal to the Union. We also now appreciate
the strategic fact that every vital military operation involved
in that gigantic effort depended on maritime control.1 From
the capture of New Orleans by Farragut, through Sherman's
march to the sea to Lee's surrender at Appomattox, it may
with safety be asserted that, with the exception of the Vicksburg and Chattanooga operations, there was not one even considerable operation which would have been possible had the
national government been unable to sustain itself as the dominant sea power. This, as respects the domestic situation. And
yet in July, r86r, Secretary Seward did not hesitate to profess
his implicit confidence in the ability of the national government
both to overcome the Confederacy and successfully to meet any
possible combination of European nations, or, as he himself
put it, to "suppress rebellion and defeat invasion besides." 2
What then had he in mind when so frequently indulging in the
metaphorical prediction that "a contest between Great Britain
and the United States would wrap the world in fire"? This
prediction, too, he now uttered when actively negotiating for
the accession of the United States to what was known as the
Declaration of Paris, by which "privateering is and remains
abolished."
I am not aware that Secretary Seward ever, either in his
correspondence or in any conversation of which we have a
record, enlarged upon this subject in detail. In the course of
a despatch to Mr. Adams, written on the morrow of Bull Run,
he thus expressed himself: "If, through error, on whatever
side, this civil contention shall transcend the national bounds
and involve foreign States, the energies of all commercial nations, including our own, will necessarily be turned to war, and
a general carnival of the adventurous and the reckless of all
_1

2 Proceedings, XIX. 3u- 326.

• Barnes, Thurlow Weed, n. 410.
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countries, at the cost of the existing commerce of the world,
must ensue." 1 This is suggestive; but a more detailed and
1 To trace conjecturally the line of thought or reasoning pursued by Seward in
the presence of the quite unforeseeable phases assumed by the course of events at
this juncture has a distinct psychological interest, and is, moreover, essential to
any correct understanding of his acts and utterances. Essentially an imaginative
man, Seward had also, as Bancroft points out (n. 505), a strong emotional and
sentimental side to his character. To this was largely due his unbounded faith in
the spirit of nationality in the American people, and his impulse to an appeal to
patriotism in presence of a domestic complication. This faith was in him unbounded, and found frequent and at times eloquent expression. It inspired, we
know, the fine closing sentiment of Lincoln's first inaugural, with its poetic
reference to the" mystic chords of memory" swelling the" chorus of the Union."
Nicolay-Hay, III. 323, 343. Later it caused Seward to write exhortingly to Mr.
Sumner in the midst of a most acute crisis in our foreign relations: "Rouse the
nationality of the American people. I t is an instinct upon which you can always
rely, even when the conscience that ought never to slumber is drugged to death.''
A passage of similar tenor is quoted by Bancroft (n. 183) from a despatch to Dayton: "Down deep in the heart of the American people - deeper than the love of
trade, or of freedom - deeper than the attachment to any local or sectional interest, or partisan pride or individual ambition- deeper than any other sentiment
- is that one out of which the Constitution of this Union arose-namely, American Independence-independence of all foreign control, alliance, or influence."
With this faith in the possibility of an appeal to what he considered an irresistible
power when aroused, Seward's memory insensibly went back to the traditions of
the War of 1812, and his own impressions based on features of that struggle and
recollection of its phases and incidents; for, born in May, 18o1, Seward was at
the impressionable age of fourteen when the war closed. The part then played by
the American privateers is familiar history. Reverting to that national experience, Seward, like President Buchanan, appears to have reasoned somewhat
as follows:
(1) "Our most effectual means of annoying a great naval power upon the ocean
is by granting letters of marque and reprisal." (S1ipra, 8.) •
(2) In certain emergencies, he declared, "we must let loose our privateers."
(\V'elles, Diary, I. 437.)
(3) Finding their way to every sea, these privateers will "wrap the whole
world in flames. No power so remote that she will not feel the fire of our battle
and be burned by our conflagration."
(Russell, My Diary, December 16,

1861.)

(4) Consequently, any struggle in which we may be involved will be "dreadful, but the end will be sure and swift.'' (Seward at Washingkm, n. 575.)
In pursuing some such line of reasoning, and in reaching this conclusion,
Seward, as is now obvious, left out of consideration the vital fact that since 1815
steam had replaced canvas in naval operations. Jefferson Davis at the same
time, but on the other side, made the same mistake. Sustained privateering was,
therefore, possible in 186x only for vessels propeUed by steam. This the Confederacy early learned. So far as appears, it does not seem to have occurred to
Secretary ·seward that in case of hostilities with the leading nations of Europe
practically every foreign port in the world would have been closed to American
vessels. It ,vould have been impossible for them to hold the sea. The blockade
of the Confederacy would have been raised, and the loyal States would have been
in turn blockaded. _Under these circumstances, the American privateer, could it
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fairly adequate idea of what was then in Seward's mind can
perhaps be derived from the Diary of Mr. Welles, who himself
seems to have participated to a somewhat inexplicable extent
in the highly con.flagratory confidence of his colleague. Secretary
Welles certainly did not as a habit share the views of Mr.
Seward; but none the less, writing at a period two years later
and even more critical, he on this "wrap-the-world-in-fire"
topic thus expressed himself:
A war with England would be a serious calamity to us, but scarcely
less serious to her. She cannot afford a maritime conflict with us,
even in our troubles, nor will she. We can live within ourselves if
worse comes to worse. Our territory is compact, facing both oceans,
and in latitudes which furnish us in abundance without foreign aid
all the necessaries and most of the luxuries of life; but England has
a colonial system which was once her strength, but is her weakness in
these days and with such a people as our countrymen to contend with.
Her colonies are scattered over the globe. We could, with our public
and private armed ships, interrnpt and destroy her communication
with her dependencies, her colonies, on which she is as dependent for
prosperity as they on her. I was therefore in favor of meeting her
face to face, asking only what is right but submitting to nothing that
is wrong.
If the late despatches are to be taken as the policy she intends to
pursue, it means war, and if war is to come it looks to me as of a
magnitude greater than the world has ever experienced,---' as if it
have kept the sea, would have had no port of a foreign country in which to get
supplies or into which to send its prizes; and the ports of its own country, where
machinery could have been repaired and coal obtained, would have been closed.
Hence every inducement as well as facility for privateering would have ceased
to exist. The ports of the Confederacy would meanwhile have been opened, with
a consequent unobstructed movement of cotton to Europe, and a counter unobstructed movement of arms, munitions and stores to the Confederacy.
Under such circumstances, it would seem as if Secretary Seward indulged in a
delusion no less deceptive and dangerous than that at the same time indulged in
by Jefferson Davis over the potency of cotton as a finally controlling factor in
modern politics as well as trade. The maintenance of the blockade of the Confederacy, in fact, was essential to the success of the national government; and,
whatever else might have resulted from a foreign intervention, had it occurred
during the Civil War, the United States would have Jost its control of the sea and
the blockade of the Confederacy would have been raised. It is difficult now to see
how in such case the cause of the Union could have been sustained. If his reasoning
was really that indicated by his utterances, official and familiar, and they were not
for mere effect, Mr. Seward would on this subject seem to have been wrong in his
every premise. He left out of his equation not only steam and electricity but a half
century of scientific development.

would eventuate in the upheaval of nations, the overthrow of governments and dynasties. The sympathies of the mass of mankind
would be with us rather than with the decaying dynasties and the
old effete governments. Not unlikely the conflict thus commenced
would kindle the torch of civil war throughout Christendom, and even
nations beyond.1
The condition of affairs opens a vast field. Should a commercial
war commence, it will affect the whole world. The police of the seas
will be broken up, and the peaceful intercourse of nations destroyed.
Those governments and peoples that have encouraged and are fostering our dissensions will themselves reap the bitter fruits of their
malicious intrigues. In this great conflict, thus wickedly begun there
will be likely to ensue an uprising of the nations that will shatter
existing governments and overthrow the aristocracies and dynasties
not only of England but of Europe. 2
Two men, mentally so differently constituted, thus concurred
in what, involving as it did the mastery of the sea, cannot but
impress the modern investigator as a singularly visionary and
delusive hallucination. Nevertheless, it would seem that
W. H. Russell was right when, on another occasion, he debated
in his own mind whether Secretary Seward believed in the
somewhat "tall" talk in which on this subject he was apt to
indulge. After meditating the proposition carefully, Russell
concluded that the Secretary really did have faith in the views
he expressed.3 Under the circumstances, it is difficult to avoid
1 Diary, I. 258-259.
• Diary, I. 251. The following passage from a speech delivered in the House of
Representatives by Thaddeus Stevens, of Pe=sylvania, December 30, 1861, is
of a similar tenor. Mr. Stevens was chairman of the Committee of Ways and
Means, and the entire speech is curiously suggestive of the rhodomontade very
generally indulged in at that stage of the conflict:

"War is always a mighty evil. With England it would be especially deplorable. But war with all nations is better than national dishonour and disgrace.
We should be better able to meet England in arms with the rebel States in alliance with her than if they were still loyal. They have a vastly extended defenceless frontier easily accessible by a maritime enemy. Most of the army and navy
of the nation during the last war were required for its defence. If we were relieved
from protecting them, we could use all our forces in other quarters. We should
then do what we ought long since to have done - organize their domestic enemies
against them, who would find themselves and their allies sufficient employment
at home without invading the North. If such a deplorable war should be forced
upon us we should do what we ought to have done in the last war - rectify our
Eastern and Northern boundaries; and our banner would wave over freemen,
and none but republican freemen, from the Gull of Mexico to the Arctic Ocean,
and from the Bay•of St. Lawrence to Puget Sound."
My Diary, April 4, 186r.
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the conclusion reached by Secretary Welles in other connections,
that Secretary Seward was in his mental make-up essentially
visionary and erratic.1 He was also, as :Mr. Sumner asserted,
somewhat wanting in what is known as hard, common sense.2
Nevertheless, these characteristics again must be taken with
qualifications. While Seward was visionary and to an exceptional and unfortunate degree addicted to prophetic utterance,
yet, as a saving grace, he rarely allowed his visions to commit
him to any action involving irretrievable disaster; while, as
respects his erratic tendencies, when boldly challenged he became, as Mr. \Velles asserted, "timid, uncertain, and distrustful"; 3 and, "while thus lacking in a dangerous tenacity of
purpose, he was naturally disposed to oblique and indirect
movements. With an almost phenomenal quickness of apprehension, however, he possessed "wonderful facility and aptness
in adapting himself to circumstances and exigencies which he
could not control, and a fertility in expedients, with a dexterity
in adopting or dismissing plans and projected schemes, unsurpassed." 4 Very similar conclusions in these respects ,,·ere
reached by Mr. Bancroft, when he wrote in his Life: "There
was in Seward's nature so much that was emotional and sentimental aside from what was subtle, and it was so common for
him to seek to accomplish his purpose by indirect means, that
it is often impossible to distinguish impulse from calculation." 5
Reverting now to the narrative, it is well to bear in mind
that, at the very hour Russell's description of the call at the
State Department was recorded, the crisis was impending ;
seventeen days later only "the strength of the Union" was to be
brought to bear against the Confederacy, with results which
would render it difficult to deny the latter the status of a belligerent. Our somewhat hastily improvised and extremely vainglorious martial array was to be chased back to Washington in
panic flight by "the power existing in pronunciamento only."
So much for the situation as, in the period of this episode, it
affected Seward's mental operations and plans of procedure.
There can, I think, be no reasonable doubt of the program he
had in mind up to Bull Run; but, five months later, that program and the sequence of events were clearly set forth by
1

Welles, Diary, I. n, 275.

• Welles, Lincoln a.1,d Seward, 43.

2

l b., 285.

• lb., 153, 154.
' Bancroft, n. 505.

Lyons in a despatch to Earl Russell, dated December 6, 1861,
and received in London December 25th, at the very crisis of
the subsequent Trent affair. Lyons wrote:
A great deal of the space [in the diplomatic correspondence accompanying the President's message that day published] devoted to [England and France] is occupied by the negotiations concerning the
adherence of the United States to the Declaration of Paris. Mr.
Adams writes frequently and at great length concerning his misapprehension of your Lordship's intentions as to transferring the
negotiation to Washington. The simple explanation of this misapprehension is, that Mr. Seward refused to see the despatch in which
your Lordship's proposals were made. Your Lordship will recollect
that Mr. Seward, having been permitted by M. Mercier and me to
read and consider in private that despatch, and a despatch of a similar tenor from the Government of France, refused to receive the
formal copies we were instructed to place in his hands, or to take any
official notice of their contents. . . . From several of the papers now
published, it appears that it was only an act of common prudence,
on the part of the Governments of Great Britain and France, not to
accept the accession of this country to the Declaration of Paris, without stating distinctly what obligations they intended by doing so to
assume with regard to the Seceded States. Little doubt can remain,
after reading the papers, that the accession was offered solely with
a view to the effect it would have on the privateering operations
of the Southern States; and that a refusal on the part of England
and France, after having accepted the accession, to treat the Southern privateers as pirates, would have been made a serious grievance,
if not a ground of quarrel. . .. In the letter from Mr. Seward to Mr.
Dayton of the 22d June, the following passage occurs: "We shall
continue to regard France as respecting our Government until she
practically acts in violation of her friendly obligations to us, as
we understand them. When she does that, it will be time enough
to inquire whether if we accede to the Treaty of Paris she could,
after that, allow pirates upon our commerce shelter in her ports, and
what our remedy should then be. We have no fear on this head."

Had, therefore, the movement to Bull Run resulted differently, as Mr. Seward confidently believed it would, he had it
in mind then to assume an aggressive attitude, boldly disclosing his ultimate object. He would insist on United States
sovereignty, and the outlawing of all Confederate cruisers as
pirates under the laws of the United States become operative
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as respects them by virtue of the adhesion of that country to
the Declaration of Paris.
But, weeks before the 21st of July, and its catastrophe, the
Declaration of Paris negotiation had passed out of Seward's
hands into the hands of Messrs. Adams and Dayton.
Their personalities and views of the situation have next to be
considered.
Mr. Adams seems to have approached the negotiation in
perfect good faith, holding that the articles of the Declaration of Paris were right in themselves, constituting a distinct
advance in international law; and, being right, they should
be acceded to by the United States on their merits and in good
faith. He did not contemplate an ulterior move; had no eye
to possible impending complications; nor did he apparently
grasp Seward's scheme in all its consequences. He, therefore,
proceeded in a straightforward way to negotiate the accession
of the United States to the Paris Declaration. In so doing he
acted as it was incumbent on a diplomatic agent to act. He
carried out his instructions in a spirit of obedience, and with
unquestioning loyalty to his chief.
Mr. Dayton otherwise viewed the thing proposed. He apprehended early trouble between the United States and Great
Britain, and considered that in such contingency privateering
was a weapon of aggressive warfare which the United States
should on no account abandon. He was, therefore, most reluctant to carry out his instructions, and did so only when
they reached him in positive and explicit terms.
What policy and scheme of subsequent, alternative action
were in Secretary Seward's mind when he forwarded those instructions, looking to the adherence of the United States to
the Articles of the Declaration of Paris "pure and simple"
can only now be matter of surmise. One thing would seem apparent. Secretary Seward at this juncture looked forward to
serious foreign complications as at least probable. Neither in
case of such complications does he seem to have proposed in
any event so to commit the United States that in case of emergency a recourse could not be had to privateering as an effective
weapon in warfare, especially in the case of Great Britain. On
the contrary, both in his own utterances and in the Diary
records of Secretary Welles a resort to letters of marque in
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the event of a foreign complication when the world would be
"wrapped in fire" seems to be asswned as a matter of course.1
In the absence of any direct avowal, which could, under the
circumstances, hardly be looked for, the inevitable inference,
therefore, is that in such eventuality the American Secretary
of State, with his "wonderful facility and aptness in adapting
himself to circumstances and exigencies which he could not
control," and his "fertility in expedients, combined with dexterity in adopting or dismissing plans and projected schemes," 2
proposed to extricate himself from a commitment then become
undesirable by asserting that through their refusal to recognize
the cruisers of the Confederacy as pirates the foreign powers
had themselves disregarded the Declaration of P aris with respect to privateering, thus releasing the United States from its
obligations.
Through such confusion of thought and juggling of phrases
the Secretary of State apparently saw a path clear before him
in any eventuality. The United States was to find itself free
to a recourse to what in the absence of the Declaration of Paris
had always been I egarded as a legitimate method of warfare.
As usual, the onus of the violated obligation would have been
trans£erred to the other parties thereto.
The British representative at Washington, Lord Lyons, was
the only dramatis perso-na in these negotiations remaining to be
considered. Of him it may fairly be said that his course throughout seems to furnish no ground for criticism. Placed in a most
difficult position, and apparently at times treated by Mr.
Seward with scant personal and official courtesy, he bore himself
with quiet dignity, preserving an even temper and perfom1ing
admirably his duties. His reports and despatches have not as
yet been made accessible in full; but, so far as appears, acting
loyally to his chief and paying obedience, both strict and tactful, to his instructions, he kept the British Foreign Office accurately and fully informed as to the course of events. Moreover,
he seems to have understood his opponent, correctly divining
his plan of operations and ulterior purpose. That he distrusted
1 A most annoying and destructive weapon of warfare, the" wolves of the sea"
were bitterly denounced by the American Secretary of the Navy at the very time
when, in case of a conflict with Great Britain, recourse would, be declared, be had
to "letters of marque and every means in our power." Diary, I. 250.
' Welles, Li11coltl and Str,JJard, 43.
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Mr. Seward and considered him very capable of covert dealing
was well understood in Washington. This was the case to such a
degree that Mr. Sumner told Secretary Welles that the British
Minister had given him to understand that he was "cautious
and careful in all his transactions" with the Secretary, and
that he "made it a point to reduce all matters with Seward of
a public nature to writing." 1 Nevertheless, owing doubtless
to his tact, good temper, and the confidence in himself Lord
Lyons had inspired, Mr. Welles later on recorded the following
belief: "To a mortifying extent Lord Lyons shapes and directs,
through the Secretary of State, an erroneous policy to this
government. This is humiliating, but true." 2
That, in the case of Mr. Seward, the judgment of Gideon
Welles was biased and ahnost invariably harsh and unfavorable, is apparent. He is a prejudiced witness. None the less,
a shrewd and incisive judge of character, and a very honest
man, the Secretary of the Navy saw things in Lincoln's cabinet
from the inside, - his sources of information were the best and
most direct. That he was misinformed as to foreign affairs
and not infrequently mistaken as well as rash in his judgments
concerning them, is apparent from his contemporaneous records;
and yet, making all possible allowance on these heads, it is not
easy to see how a higher official tribute than that here paid by
him could well have been paid to the Minister of a foreign country during a most critical period.
Perhaps, however, the best resume of the situation in June,
186 I, so far as Lord Lyons was concerned, is to be found in W. H.
Russell's Diary. He there (chapter xuv) records the fact that
returning from his trip through the Confederacy, and reaching
Washington on the3d of July,he found Lord Lyons at the British
Legation, and was sorry to observe that he looked "rather careworn and pale." As a result of what he then learned he further
stated that Mr. Seward, as the Southern Confederacy developed
its power, assumed ever higher ground, and became more exacting and defiant. He went on as follows, referring to what had
recently taken place:
Seward has been fretful, irritable, and acrimonious; and it is
not :::>o much to suppose Mr. Sumner has been useful in allaying
1\fr.
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Welles, Diary, r. 288.

2

Diary, 1, 399, 409•
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irritation. A certain despatch was written last June, which amounted
to little less than a declaration of war against Great Britain. Most
fortunately the President was induced to exercise his power. The
despatch was modified though not without opposition, and was forwarded to the English Minister with its teeth drawn. Lord Lyons,
who is one of the suavest and quietest of diplomatists, has found it
difficult, I fear, to maintain personal relations with Mr. Seward at
times. Two despatches have been prepared for Lord John Russell,
which could have had no result but to lead to a breach of the peace,
had not some friendly interpositor succeeded in averting the wrath of
the Foreign Minister.1
So far as the second, third and fourth articles of the Declaration of Paris were concerned, they in the negotiation now
carried on presented no difficulty. The question turned wholly
on the first, - that is, "Privateering is and remains abolished."
As respects this, the battle of Bull R un entirely changed the
diplomatic situation. After J uly 21, 1861, it was practically
out of the question to deny that the Confederates were belligerents, and, on land or sea, to be treated as such. Nevertheless, the attempted confusion of Confederate cruisers duly
commissioned, with privateers sailing under letter of marque,
and these with piracy, was pressed until the following October.
Then at last those captured on one of the Confederate commercedestroyers were brought to trial, and a member of the crew of
the Jeff Davis was convicted and sentenced to death.2 Of
course the sentence was not executed; and the farce, prolonged,
as such since July 21, then came to a close; and with it one of
Seward's most involved diplomatic schemes.
The United States simply had to back down; or, as Seward
the day following the battle wrote to his wife, - "nothing remains but to reorganize and begin again." 3
The European negotiations had, however, already languished
to a conclusion, all the diplomatic formalities being duly observed. Before the tidings of the catastrophe of J uly 21 reached
Europe, the negotiation had come to a head. A formal convention was concluded CTuly 18) for the adhesion of the United
States to the Declaration of P aris, and awaited signature; but
on J uly 31st Earl Russell, just as the news of what had occurred
1
2

Russell, Diary, 377.
Rhodes, m. 429; Nicolay and Hay, v.

1
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at Bull Run was about to reach London, took occasion to notify
Mr. Adams that, if the proposed convention should be signed,
the engagement on the part of Great Britain would be "prospective," and would "not invalidate anything already done."
In transmitting the correspondence to Secretary Seward, Mr.
Adams somewhat nai:vely observed that he did not understand
the meaning of this phrase. In other words, it would appear that
the ingenious confusion of terms - belligerency, sovereignty,
insurgency, Confederate cruisers, letters of marque, privateering, pirates and piracy, the last five being in the plan of Mr.
Seward interchangeable - the significance, I say, of this confusion of terms had not occurred to the American negotiator.
It was, however, very present in the minds of both the British
Foreign Secretary and the American Secretary of State. But at
just this juncture, and while Mr. Adams was meditating the
problem, tidings reached him of what had occurred in front of
Washington on the 21st of the previous month. This was on
August 4th; and the American negotiator had good occasion
to write in his diary, "Thus a change is made in all our expectations, and the war from this time assumes a new character. My own emotion is not to be described."
Applying to Secretary Seward for further instructions, Mr.
Adams was presently advised that the word "prospective" in
Earl Russell's enigmatic statement was considered "unimportant"; but the declaration that the signature of the convention should "not invalidate anything already done" was
suggestive of difficulties. Would Earl Russell kindly specify?
This despatch did not reach Mr. Adams until after August 28th,
- twenty-four days after the news of Bull Run had got to
London, establishing the fact of Confederate belligerency beyond peradventure. Mr. Adams had then as the result of
further correspondence already received a despatch from Earl
Russell, prepared evidently in the full light of the recent military
occurrence which had worked a change so material in all the
American minister's "expectations." This despatch was conclusive. So far as "specification" was concerned, it certainly
left nothing to inference. Earl Russell now wrote:
It was most desirable in framing a new agreement not to give rise
to a fresh dispute.
But the different attitude of Great Britain and of the United
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States in regard to the internal dissensions now unhappily prevailing in the United States gave warning that such a dispute might
arise out of the proposed convention.
Her Majesty's Government, upon receiving intelligence that the
President had declared by proclamation his intention to blockade
the ports of nine of the States of the Union, and that Mr. Davis,
speaking in the name of those nine States, had declared his intention
to issue letters of marque and reprisals, and having also received
certain information of the design of both sides to arm, had come to
the conclusion that civil war existed in America, and Her Majesty
had thereupon proclaimed her neutrality in the approaching contest.
The Government of the United States, on the other hand, spoke
only of unlawful combinations, and designated those concerned in
them as rebels and pirates. It would follow logically and consistently,
from the attitude taken by Her Majesty's Government, that the
so-called Confederate States, being acknowledged as a belligerent,
might, by the law of nations, arm privateers, and that their privateers must be regarded as the armed vessels of a belligerent.
With equal logic and consistency it would follow, from the position taken by the United States, that the privateers of the Southern
States might be decreed to be pirates, and it might be further argued
by the Government of the United States that a European power
signing a convention with the United States, declaring that privateering was and remains abolished, would be bound to treat the privateers of the so-called Confederate States as pirates.
Hence, instead of an agreement, charges of bad faith and violation
of a convention might be brought in the United States against the
power signing such a convention, and treating the privateers of the
so-called Confederate States as those of a belligerent power.
Not unnaturally, in view of the facts which have here been
recounted, and the inferences almost necessarily to be drawn
from them, Secretary Seward in due ti.me (September 7th) pronounced the proposed reservation quite "inadmissible." And
here the curtain finally fell on this somewhat prolonged and
not altogether creditable diplomatic farce. 1
What, however, now seems more particularly to deserve
attention in a study of this episode is the extreme danger appar1 [In his annual message to Congress in December, 1861, President Lincoln said:
"Although we have failed to induce some of the commercial powers to adopt a
desirable melioration of the rigor of maritime war, we have removed all obstruc. tions from the way of this humane reform except such as are merely of temporary
and accidental occurrence." Eo.)
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ently incurred therein by the United States. Indeed, without
its being realized by any one, the country then seems to have
practically challenged a greater peril than ever confronted it,
with a single exception, through the succeeding years. All, in
fact, depended upon the good faith of Earl Russell in pursuance
of his policy of neutrality. Earl Russell, by great good luck,
chanced to be a conventional British statesman; but had he
been a man more of the Bismarck.ian type, and seen the situation clearly, the result would, if Mr. Henry Adams's view of the
situation is correct, have been inevitable. He, in his paper, assumes, and undertakes to show, that Earl Russell throughout
this episode acted evasively, practically in bad faith, and with
an ulterior and concealed end always in view. That end was
the early recognition of the Confederacy, and a consequent
division of the United States. From the outset, as Mr. Henry
Adams asserts, Earl Russell wanted to put the American Minister in the position of representing a portion only of a divided
country, and there hold him.
But if this assumption is correct, the whole game was, in the
negotiation which has been described, thrown by Secretary
Seward into Earl Russell's hands. All the latter had to do was
at once to accede to the proposal of the United States, and
admit it by convention to the Articles of the Declaration of
P aris. He would then have left the Secretary of State to get
the assent of the Senate to that convention; which, however,
Lord Lyons had already advised would, under the circumstances, be very difficult to obtain. This, however, a Bismarckian diplomat, if Mr. Henry Adams's theory as to the
attitude of Russell and the British ministry is correct, would
not have regarded. It would, in fact, in no way have concerned
him. He would simply have acknowledged the right to accede,
and claimed that, so far as the United States was concerned,
"Privateering was and would remain abolished" thereby.
The next inevitable step would have followed, and that
soon. Seward, as Secretary of State, would have insisted
that the United States spoke for the Confederacy, and, the
Confederacy not being a belligerent recognized by the United
States, the letters of marque issued by it constituted a license
for piracy under the American law; and the American law on
that point must be held to prevail. The cruisers of the unrec-

ognized defaclo government had consequently no status on the
ocean. They were not even privateers within the purview of
the Declaration of Paris. They were simply pseudo-commissioned corsairs. A year later he angrily referred to them as
"piratical cruisers," the presence of which on the ocean seemed
"to leave to the United States at most no hope of remaining at
peace with Great Britain without sacrifices for which no peace
could ever compensate." 1 And again seventeen months later,
under date of December 8, 1862, he said that up to a time
shortly before, there was "a prevailing consciousness on our
part that we were not yet fully prepared for a foreign war.
This latter conviction is passing away. It is now apparent to
observing and considerate men that no European state is as
really capable to do us harm as we are capable to defend ourselves. . . . The whole case may be summed up in this: The
United States claim, and they must continually claim, that
in this war they are a whole sovereign nation, and entitled
to the same respect as such that they accord to Great
Britain. Great Britain does not treat them as such a sovereign, and hence all the evils that disturb their intercourse
and endanger their friendship." 2
Assuming this attitude a year earlier, - and it apparently
was Seward's next projected move on the diplomatic chessboard, as the pieces stood thereon after the firing on Sumter
and before the Bull Run catastrophe, - the plain opportunity
would then have presented itself to the Bismarckian statesman having the program in view which Mr. Henry Adams
attributes to Earl Russell. The reply would have been an immediate and emphatic, "Very well; all that being so, we will
now recognize the Confederacy as a member of the family of
nations. After that, there can be no question whatever as to
public commerce-destroyers, privateers or pirates. Every
vessel sailing under its flag will be as much a public ship of
war as one sailing under the flag of the United States. But,
so far as the United States is concerned,' Privateering is, and
remains, abolished!'"
1 Geneva Award Record, CDrresponae11u CDtlarning Claims agafost Great
Britai,i, October 20, 1862, I. 26o.
2 Geneva Award Record, Corresponae,ue co11ceming Claims agafost Great
Brilain, October 20, 1862, I. 261.
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Seward would, by his course, have thus brought about the
very result the United States had greatest cause to apprehend
and most desired to avoid. In other words, he would have fallen
headlong into the somewhat obviously yawning pit he had elaborately designed for others.
How perilously near the country came to the verge of that
pit is made apparent in Mr. Bancroft's account of what was
known as the Consul Bunch incident,1 which occurred contemporaneously. Into the details of this incident it is not necessary here to enter. It is sufficient to say that while the negotiation for the adhesion of the Unhed States to the Declaration
of Paris was in progress in Europe, Robert Bunch, British Consul at Charleston, was carrying on something bearing a strong
resemblance to a diplomatic intrigue looking to a partial adhesion at least of the Confederate Government to the same Declaration. The fact came to the knowledge of Secretary Seward,
and the papers and despatches of Consul Bunch were at the
proper time IBtercepted. Subsequently they were forwarded,
through Mr. Adams, to the British Foreign Office. From these
papers it appeared that Mr. William Henry Trescot of South
Carolina, who had previously been in the diplomatic senrice of
the United States, was now serving as an intermediary between
Consul Bunch, acting on an intimation from Lord Lyons, and,
J efferson Davis, looking to an understanding to be effected
with the Confederacy.
A new and extremely interesting dramatis persona here enters
on the scene; the strong individuality of Mr. Davis must now
be taken into account. Mr. Trescot met Davis at Gordonsville,
Virginia, while the latter, naturally elated over the victory just
won, was on his way back to Richmond fresh from the Bull
Run battle-field. Mr. Bancroft then says that a certain dissatisfaction at the way in which the negotiation now proposed
to him had been opened seemed to cloud Davis's perception of
the possible advantage to be derived from it. Instead, therefore, of at once acceding to the suggestion, and thereby establishing quasi relations with the governments of England and
France, Davis merely gave to the proposition a general approval,
promising to refer the question to the Confederate Congress.
This he subsequently did; and the Congress, in August, r86r,
1

Seward, n. 195-203.

passed a series of resolutions, drafted, it is said, by Davis-himself/ approving all the Articles of the Declaration of Paris except that referring to privateers. The right of privateering was,
however, especially emphasized, and reserved.2
This seems to be a somewhat inadequate disposal of what was
in reality a crucial matter.3 It would really almost seem as if a
special Providence was then safeguarding the American Union
equally against the blunders of its friends and the machinations of its enemies. The fact is that Jefferson Davis was at
just this juncture obsessed with three accepted convictions,
each one of which in the close proved erroneous; but the three
together dictated bis policy. These convictions were: (1) that
the decisive military success just won at Manassas was final
as respects the establishment of the Confederacy as an independent nationality; (2) that the control of cotton as a commercial
staple put it in the power of the Confederacy to dictate a foreign policy to the European powers; and (3) that the free issuance of letters of marque to privateers was a terribly destructive weapon of warfare in the hands of the insurgent States.
On these factors in the situation he now implicitly relied; and
time was yet to show him that, combined, they were but a
broken reed. Davis was, however, an essentially self-centred
and, in bis way, an opinionated man. Implicitly believing he
now saw bis way clearly, be acted accordingly; and what,
differently handled, might have proved a great opportunity
for the Confederacy, wholly escaped, unseen and ncglected._J .
1

Nicolay and Hay, IV. 279.

2 [Journal of the Co11gress of the Co11federale Stales of America, I. 341. These

resolutions were substituted, and apparently somewhat hastily, for others which
had recently been adopted by the Congress. The lottmal shows that on July 30
Mr. Hunter of Virginia introduced a preamble and resolutions defining the position of the Confederate States on points of maritime law, as laid down by the
Congress of Paris of 1856, which were referred to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs. On August 2 Mr. Rhett reported them back to the House, with a recommendation that they pass. Six days after, on motion of Mr. Barnwell, the special
order was postponed to consider those resolutions, and the House passed them,
On the 9th Mr. Memminger, by unanimous consent, moved to reconsider the vote.
and the resolutions were laid on the table. August 13 Hunter submitted a new
set of resolutions as a substitute for those on the table, and the House acted at
onc-.e. The earlier resolutions were not printed in the J 011rnal. ED.}
3 See also Nicolay and Hay, IV. 278-28o where the whole Declaration of Paris
1
negotiation, including the Bunch incident, receives in my judgment a treatment
both inadequate and mistaken. When that work was prepared, the facts of the
situation had been but imperfectly disclosed.
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For, in the full light of subsequent developments and disclosures, it is not difficult to see how a somewhat less self-confident
and provincial President of the Confederacy, and a somewhat
more astute and clear-sighted British Secretary of Forejgn
Affairs, would, under conditions then existing, have availed
themselves of this opporturuty to bring about the result which
Mr. Henry Adams asserts Earl Russell from the beginning
had in view. But for the good faith of Earl Russell in following
out his policy of strict neutrality, and the apparent overconfidence indulged in by Davis in consequence of the recent
Confederate success at Bull Run,1 the way lay open to a direct
and full recognition of the Confederacy. The inchoate negotiation initiated by Consul Bunch was by him regarded as the
first step in that direction; and, as Mr. Trescot pointed out
to Davis, if Mr. Seward's loudly proclaimed threat was carried
out, that such recognition would be regarded by the United
States as a casus belli, Great Britain and France must, as a
succeeding and final step, be brought into the struggle as allies
of the Confederacy. As a result thereof the world might, as
Mr. Seward confidently anticipated, "be wrapped in fire";
but the blockade would surely be raised! Jefferson Davis was
yet to learn that, with the blockade in force, no port for prizes
was open, and privateering was, consequently, pro hac vice, an
antiquated and useless weapon in the armory of warfare. If
then it were abandoned by the Confederacy as the price of
such an alliance as that now suggested, the Confederate British-constructed cruiser would, with its prizes, have free ingress
to and egress from the ports not only of the Confederacy but
of Great Britain and France. However this might or might not
have proved the case, one thing is apparent: If the motive
and policy of the Palmerston-Russell Government was in the
Summer of 1861 what Mr. Hetuy Adams so confidently asserts,
no better opportunity of reaching the end it had in view ever
presented itself than was presented in the course of the proceedings which have just been described.
1 "There grew up [after the Battle of Bull Run] all over the South such a
perfect confidence in its strength and its perfect ability to work its own salvation
that very little care was felt for the action of Europe. In fact, the people were
i ust now quite willing to wait for recognition of their independence by European
powers, until it was already achieved." De Leon, Four Years i11 Rebel Capitals,

130.
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Fortunately for the United States, the policy at this juncture
pursued by Earl Russell was far more straightforward, aboveboard and direct than at the time he had credit for, especially
in America, or than the American Minister in London then, or
Mr. Henry Adams since, has credited to him.1 In other words,
so far as the record shows, Earl Russell, at that time at least,
meant what he said, and carried himself accordingly. Mr. Henry
Adams, on the contrary, writing so lately as 1907, has expressed
his conviction that Earl Russell's management of the Declaration of Paris negotiation "strengthened the belief that [he] had
started in May, 1861, with the assumption that the Confederacy
was established . . . and he was waiting only for the proper
moment to interpose." This, Mr. Henry Adams further asserts,
seemed at the time so self-evident that no one then in the American London Legation would have doubted the proposition "except that Lord Russell obstinately denied the whole charge,
and persisted in assuring Minister Adams of his honest and
impartial neutrality." 2 If this was indeed the case, it can in the
full light of subsequent revelations only now be concluded that
the British Foreign Secretary was either truthful in his asseverations, or that in August, 1861, he failed to avail himself of
a most admirable opportunity to carry out his :fixed policy, and
most effectually to "interpose."
Meanwhile, the confusion of speech intentionally created for
an ulterior purpose by Seward in May and June, 1861, has
continued indefinitely. Take our associate Mr. Schouler, for
instance. In his History he says: "the Palmerston ministry
1 Mr. Adams, apparently as the result of later experience and calmer reflection, saw occasion to revise his opinion of Earl Russell's motives and official
action. In his opinion, as one of the Geneva Board of Arbitration, on the case
of the Florida, he expressed himself as follows: " . . . I hope I may not be exceeding my just limits if I seize this occasion to do a simple act of justice to
that eminent statesman. Much as I may see cause to differ with him in his
limited construction of his own duty, or in the views which appear in these
papers to have been taken by him of the policy proper to be pursued by Her
:Majesty's government, I am far from drawing any inferences from them to the
effect that he was actuated in any way by motives of ill-will to the United
States, or, indeed, by unworthy motives of any kind. If I were permitted to
judge from a calm comparison of the relative weight of his various opinions
with his action in different contingencies, I should be led rather to infer a balance of good-will than of hostility to the United States." Papers relating to the
Treaty of Washington, rv. 162.
2 Ed111;ation of Henry Adams, 128.
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connived presently at an evasion by which such vessels ceased
strictly to be 'privateers' by receiving commissions from Jefferson Davis as regular war-vessels of the Confederacy." 1
And yet the distinction here referred to was manifest, fundamental and universally recognized.2 The Sumter and the Alabama, for instance, were constantly referred to in the papers
and memoirs of the time, sometimes as " privateers" and at
other times as "pirates." The Smnter, as already pointed
out, was a commissioned Confederate cruiser, hailing from a
Confederate port, and making its way to sea through a blockading squadron.3 On the other hand, the single weak point in
the Alabama's position was that, built and equipped at public
Confederate cost, it had no home port of record, - that is,
built in England and equipped in a neutral harbor of refuge,
though sailing under Confederate colors it had never entered a
Confederate port. I t was, however, duly commissioned by a
de facto government, and a belligerent recognized as such on
land even by the United States. E xcept in that single respect
of a home port, it was a regularly commissioned ship-of-war,
- just as much so as the Kearsarge. That a ship-of-war, the
property of a de facto government engaged in active war, was
built evasively of law in a private ship-yard of a neutral country, and throughout its entire life never entered a harbor of the
belligerent in whose service she sailed, certainly constituted an
anomaly. A naval anomaly is, however, not necessarily piracy;
nor is it at once apparent how a clause to that effect could, to
meet a novel case, be read into the accepted treatises on international usage. British in origin, equipment and crews, the
Confederate cruisers were homeless wanderers of the sea engaged in an irregular, not to say discreditable work of destruction - a work very similar in character to the wanton destruction of property by fire during a military raid. T hey were,
Ilistory of tk Unikd States, VI. 126. Also Seward at Wasliington, II. 625.
Moore, Digest, VII. 543-558.
1 The case of the Sumter subsequently led to a long diplomatic correspondence
on the point referred to in the text. In his Digest (sec. 1315) Moore says: "Special
attention may be directed to tlie note of Baron Van Zuylen of September 17,
186r, as a singularly forcible and able discussion of the question of asylum."
"Mr. Seward, writing to Mr. Pike [our Minister to tlie Netherlands] on tlie
17th of October [1861], declared that the Sumter 'was, by the laws and express
declaration of the United States, a pirate,' and protested against her receiving
the treatment of a man-of-war." Moore, Digest, vn. 986.
1
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however, still cruisers - ships of war - publicly owned and
duly commissioned. In no respect privateers, they would not
under any recognized interpretation of language have come
within the Declaration of Paris inhibition of privateering.
Neither, while engaged in a somewhat piratical work, were they
in any common acceptance of the term pirates. Sailing under a
recognized flag, they confined their ravages strictly to the commerce of an avowed belligerent. They were not common enemies of mankind. Semmes and his sailors were, in a word,
pirates under the municipal law of the United States only in
the same way and to the same extent that Gen. J. H. Morgan
and his troopers when raiding in Ohio and Indiana, immediately after Gettysburg, were, under the same law, bandits.1
It is, it is true, well established, and was then notorious, that
when the Civil War began the Confederate authorities deliberately proposed to make Great Britain the basis of systematic
naval operations directed against the United States. This was
distinctly contrary to the principles of international comity,
if not law; and yet, incredible as it now seems, the English
courts in the case of the Alexandra maintained that practically,
and subject to certain almost formal legal observances, it was
a legitimate branch of British industry! Such an attitude on
the part of an English tribunal seems now incredible. Yet it
was then gravely assumed,2 and constituted for us a sound basis
for our subsequent demand for indemnity. No neutral nation,
of course, has a right under any circumstances to permit itself
to be made a naval base for operations against a country with
which it is at peace; but its so doing does not transform an
otherwise recognized weapon of warfare into a crime against
the human race.
Thus, according to my present understanding of what then
occurred, no ground appears for criticism of either Earl Russell
or Mr. Adams in connection with the abortive negotiation of
186r. Earl Russell, adhering strictly to his policy of neutrality
Rhodes, v. 313- 316.
"From the ruling of the judge it appeared that the Confederate Government might with ease obtain as many vessels in this country as they pleased without in any manner violating out laws. It may be a great hardship to the Federals
that their opponents should be enabled to create a navy in foreign ports, but,
like many other hardships entailed on belligerents, it must be submitted to."
London Morning Posl, August 10, 1863.
1
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in the American conflict then in progress, was compelled to have
recourse at times to what in the eyes of Mr. Adams seemed to
be disingenuous evasions; but this was in order to avoid proposed commitments of the character and purport of which the
Foreign Secretary had been advised by Lord Lyons. The record
reveals nothing to justify a suspicion of Earl Russell's ulterior
purposes entertained by Mr. Adams at the time, or which confirms the inferences and conclusions of Mr. Henry Adams
since. As to Mr. Adams, he seems to have proceeded throughout
with a direct straightforwardness and manifest good faith which
at the time impressed Earl Russell with a feeling of confidence
productive thereafter of most beneficial results. Fully believing in the soundness of the policy proposed,1 and paying no
attention to the freely expressed doubts, fears, and otherwiseminded conclusions of his colleagues and compatriots in Europe
at that juncture, somewhat obtrusively thrust upon him,2 Mr.
The American Case, Gene-va Arbitration, I. 77.
(A striking example of this distinctly impertinent intrusiveness at that
period of the poaching diplomat on the preserves more especially assigned to the
supervision of Mr. Adams (see Adams, St1tdies, Military and Diplomatic, 363367) was in this connection afforded by Gen. James Watson Webb, appointed
Minister to Brazil. On his way to his post, by way of London, General Webb
had an interview with the British Foreign Secretary. Of what passed in this
interview, he at the time gave the following account in a letter to President Lincoln, dated Southampton, August 22, 186!:
"Yesterday I spent at Pembrooke Lodge, with Lord John Russell and . . . we
talked for two hours steadily on American affairs. . . . I am opposed iii toto
to the proposition of our Government to agree to a surrender of our right to issue
letters of marque, and send forth privateers in time of war; because the time of
making it exhibited weakness; because it cannot have the slightest influence
upon the pending questions, and because the Senate should and would reject
such a treaty, if made; and because I honestly and sincerely believe, that such a
treaty would be political ruin to both you and Mr. Seward; and with my friendship for both of you, and a knowledge of the People gained in thirty-four years
of editorial life, it would be weak and criminal in me, if I did not frankly say to
both of you what I think; and then let the matter rest.
"Therefore I write this unofficial letter to you instead of Seward; with a
request, however, that after reading it you will submit it to him for perusal. By
that time I shall be on my way to the far South [Brazil); and if either of you do
not like my letter, commit it to the flames. And, in fact, if the subject be not of
interest, I shall not complain if you burn it without reading.
"I told Lord Joun, that when Earl Ellesmere and other English statesmen at
Ratchford, just before I went to Paris, said we had refused to unite in putting
down privateering, I insisted that we never had refused our sanction to the proposition; but on the contrary, cheerfully accepted of it, conditioned that the
European Powers would make it more philanthropic by rendering all private
property afloat on the ocean sacred from assault in time of war as well as in peace.
1

2
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Adams carried out his instructions with unquestioning good
faith. There is, however, now reason to surmise that he did
Lord John replied, 'You were right; it was we who refused to put down privateering if by so doing all private property became sacred in time of war. England,
you know, could not consent to that.' 'Certainly not; and I justify you as an
English statesman, in consulting the interests of England by refusing your assent
to our rider on your bill. Of what use would be your enormous navy, if in time
of war you may not employ it against the commerce of the enemy? But what it
is wise and commendable for you to do for the benefit of English interests, it is
equally wise in us to do in self-defence. You refuse to respect private property
belonging to your enemy in time of war, because it is not yottr interest so to do;
and we refuse to put down privateering unless you go a step further, not because
we have any especial love for privateering, but because it is necessary for our
defence against your enormous navy, which you are compelled to keep up, and
which France forces you to augment. Your Lordship knows that it is contrary
to the genius of our people and the public sentiment, to keep up a large standing
army, or a great naval force in time of peace; and, therefore, as I e;1.-plained to
Lord Ellesmere and his friends at Ratchford, and to Napoleon at Fontainebleau,
we resort to volimteers in time of war. You do not object to our volunteers on
land, why do you so to our marine volunteers, known as "privateers"? When
we callJand volunteers into service, we make them subject to our rules and articles
of war; and when we call out our naval volunteers, we in like manner render
them subordinate to the rules and regulations for the government of the navy.
There is no difference between the two arms, except that the naval volunteers the privateers - are the most national of the two. The officers of the land or
army volunteers serve under commissions granted by the State authority; while
in all cases, the officers commanding a privateer (our naval volunteers) are commissioned by the general government. They are, in fact, as much and more a
part of the navy, as the volunteer force is a part of the army; and they render
unnecessary a large navy in time of peace. War always, more or less, interferes
with or altogether suspends commerce; and in time of war we invite our commercial marine to volunteer for naval service, under commissions granted by the
Government, and subject to naval regulations, by holding out as an inducement
the possession of all the prizes they capture. This, in the event of a war with
England and the employment of our immense commercial marine, would soon
put us in a position to do as much injury to your commerce as you, with your
immense navy, could inflict upon ours. But let us give up the right to employ
privateers, or in other words, our right to accept of volunteers in our naval service, and the English merchant, instead of finding it his interest to be at peace
with us, would have offered him a bounty to urge the Government to war; because, with your superior naval force, you would soon drive us from the ocean
and monopolize the commerce of the world.' Lord John laughed very heartily
at all this and said, ' but we never asked you to dispense with privateering. The
Paris conference made the suggestion, and it was not for 11s to refuse a good
thing; besides, we conceded what you had so long demanded, that free ships
should make free goods. But did you say all this to the Emperor?' 'Aye, and
more. I expressed my astonishment that he should have given his assent to a
proposition so palpably designed to increase the naval supremacy of England,
that ii was clearly of English origin, no matter who brought it forward.' 'And
yet,' said Lord John, 'he did assent to it, and is in favor of it.' 'That by no
means follows. He had the sagacity to perceive that our people never would
assent, and, therefore, it was wise and diplomatic in him not to oppose England
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not fully divine the purpose of his chief, being happily on that
point less fully and correctly advised than Earl Russell, then
Her Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
As to Secretary Seward, the policy he at this juncture advocated, both directly and indirectly, as well as his utterances
in pursuance thereof, are more difficult to explain. As is apparent from what has already been said, they invite analysis;
and, when analyzed, they are provocative of criticism. In considering that attitude and those utterances nearly twenty
years ago, Mr. Rhodes, in an extract already quoted, referred
to them as indicative of an "infatuation hard to understand."
T o like effect Mr. Adams, in the entry in his Diary already
quoted, wrote on receipt of Despatch No. ro, of May 2I: " I
scarcely know how to understand Mr. Seward." Since then the
Welles Diary has been published, affording what is to a large
extent an inside view of the Lincoln Cabinet movements. So
far, however, as Seward is concerned, the enigma remains in
in her project. I do not say that such is his view of the subject; but we both
know that it would have been wise and diplomatic for him so to have acted; and
in so much as he is both wise and diplomatic, his having given his assent to the
proposition by no means proves him to be in favor of it. My own opinion is that
he would hold us in contempt and never forgive us, if we were to prove untrue
to ourselves and give England this great advantage over France as well as ourselves.' Lord John then went on to say, that altogether too much importance
has been given to the subject, 'but as your present Government desire it, we will
make the treaty, even if, as you say, it is certain to be rejected.' I said, I hoped
not, because its rejection would only lead to other complications and discussions.
He replied, 'Not a bit of it. I am perfectly willing the treaty should be rejected,
because I have long been of opinion that no treaty stipulations would be of any
avail. War once commenced, you would only have to call your privateers "the
volunteer navy," or some other equally appropriate term, instead of "privateers,"
change somewhat the regulations with the name, and according to your own argument they would become part of your navy for the time being, and be respected
accordingly, by all other Powers. So we will give your administration the treaty
they ask for, and they must then settle the matter with your Senate. They may
accept or reject it at their pleasure, for it would amount to nothing; but I rather
like the manner in which you put to the Emperor the advantage conceded to us
by the Paris conference.'"
Webb sent a copy of this letter to Mr. Dayton, who replied, August 26:
"I have read with great care and interest your letter to the Prest. a copy of
which you enclosed. As it is unofficial, of course you could rightfully send it to
head-quarters direct, and I am glad you did so.
"That negotiations as to Privateering is likely to break off after all. Lord John
and Mr. Thouvenel want to add an outside declaration at the time of the execution of the Treaty which I will not agree to - nor will Mr. Adams. This is of
course altogether confidential, but my impression is, that with yqur letters to
Seward &c. it will for the present end the matter.'' Eo.] ,
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largest degree unsolved. It has been suggested that at this
juncture the Secretary of State was, like every one else, "groping his way"; or, again, that he, individually, had "lost his
head." Amid the sudden uncertainties and grave perplexities
which surrounded him, in common with all others, neither supposition is to be dismissed as beyond reasonable consideration;
but that he should then seriously and persisten~y have advocated a general foreign war, or that he should have exerted himself to the utmost through indirections to involve the country in
such a war without any understanding reached in advance with
his chief and his colleagues, seems incredible. Yet the record
apparently establishes such as having been the case. He seems,
in fact, to have been wrong-headed rather than to have
"lost his head"; and to have persisted in a path at once
devious and erroneous rather than to have been "groping his
way."
Dealing with the distinct period of the Civil War between the
attack on Fort Sumter and the defeat at Bull Run, it is in justice to every one concerned necessary constantly to recall the
fact that it was throughout formative. It was formative as respects foreign relations quite as much as in its domestic bearings. It is in evidence and indisputable that when the Fort
Sumter crisis was imminent the Secretary of State urged on the
President the expediency of forcing immediately a foreign
complication. There is also ground to believe, although on
this head the evidence is not absolutely conclusive, that so intent was Seward on at any rate postponing a civil-war outbreak,
in the hope that a foreign complication could yet be substituted
therefor, that when the Fort Sumter expedition was in course of
preparation he caused secret advices thereof to be conveyed to
the Confederate authorities, apparently with a view of having
the expedition fail without bringing on an irrevocable crisis,
or at any rate having the government at Washington appear
as the provoker of strife by striking the first blow.1 This, by
any and every device, he sought to postpone. He did not succeed; and the catastrophe occurred. Nevertheless, he seems
even then not to have thrown off his delusion as to the possible
1 On this point, see Bancroft, Seward, II. 145; letter of Montgomery Blair
of May 13, 18731 in Welles, Lincoln and Sr:-.uard, 581 66; Welles, Diary, r. 91 32;

u. r6o, 248.
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reconciliatory effect of a foreign complication; and it continued
with him until after the catastrophe at Bull Run. Indulging in
a belief that Confederate resistance would prove a delusion, and
would collapse under the first blow from Washington, he prepared the Despatch No. 10 of May 21. It is not generally
understood that in the original draft of this highly aggressive
communication Mr. Adams was instructed to con.fine himself
"simply to a delivery of a copy of this paper to the Secretary of
State [Russell], and then to break off all official intercourse
with the British Government." Further instructions were
then given him as to what policy should be pursued "when intercourse shall have been arrested from this cause." 1 As originally drawn, the despatch amounted practically to a declaration of war; as such, it will be remembered, it was modified in
essential respects by the President only in face of strong opposition on the part of the Secretary.2
Even while penning this despatch, Seward moreover put on
record an utter misapprehension of his own position, writing to
his wife: "A country so largely relying on my poor efforts to
save it had refused me the full measure of its confidence, needful to that end. I am a chief reduced to a subordinate position,
and surrounded by a guard, to see that I do not do too much
for my country." Mr. Bancroft, therefore, in his Life,3 does not
apparently go too far when he says that at this time Seward
was the "victim of an incomprehensible illusion," adding :
"The only theory on which this illusion can be explained, even
from his point of view, is that by giving full play to his imagination he was strengthened in the belief that the Union could not
be restored unless the 'chief' could get free from his 'subordinate
position' and push aside the 'guard' that was preventing him
from doing too much for his country, and that all could be accomplished by means of a foreign war, which would put him in
control, because it would grow out of questions within the
province of his duties."
Whatever his policy may have been, therefore, it would seem
that the Secretary of State was practically thwarted in his
efforts to carry it out, and reduced into what he himself considered a "subordinate position." I n view of what has already
1

Nicolay and Hay, IV,

' Seward, II. 173.

27r.

2

Russell, My Diary, July 3, r86r. . .

been said in this paper, it is hardly necessary to point out that
the"guard" referred to in the foregoing extract from Mr. Bancroft's Life was Senator Sumner, then alluded to by Mr. Seward
as a supernumerary Secretary of State in Washington, according to Mr. Welles" far too frequently consulted on controverted
or disputed international questions." 1 The evidence on this
head is not, however, confined to Mr. Welles. In a passage from
his Diary already quoted, it will be remembered that Russell attributes this thwarting of action on the part of Seward largely to
the intervention of Senator Sumner. Mr. Sumner was certainly
in Washington at the time the Despatch No. 10 was approved
by the President "with its teeth drawn," and he went back to
Boston in so excited a frame of mind that Mr. Dana, whom he
shortly afterwards met, wrote to Mr. Adams that he was "so
full of denunciations of Mr. Seward that it was suggestive of a
heated state of brain." Mr. Dana added: "He cannot talk
five minutes without bringing in Mr. Seward, and always in
bitter terms of denunciation. His mission is to expose and denounce Mr. Seward; and into that mission he puts all his usual
intellectual and moral energy." According to Mr. Sumner,
Seward was systematically "pursuing a course of correspondence, language, and manner calculated to bring England and
France to coldness, if not to open rupture." 2 Then a mystery, what Mr. Sumner had in mind has now been disclosed.
He spoke not altogether unadvisedly.3
In that portion of his History relating to this period Mr.
Rhodes says: "A fair statement of Northern sentiment by the
4th of July [1861] is that, although most of the rebels would be
pardoned by a gracious government, Jefferson Davis and the
men captured on board of vessels bearing his letters of marque
should be hanged." 4 In other words, during the period under
consideration the country as well as Mr. Seward had for the time
Welles, Lincoln and Seward, 90, r6r, 185.
C. F. Adams Mss., Boston, June 4, r86r.
1 "Mr. Sumner, as the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, is
supposed to be viewed with some jealousy by Mr. Seward, on account of the disposition attributed to him to interfere in diplomatic questions; but if he does so,
we shall have no reason to complain, as the Senator is most desirous of keeping
the peace between the two countries, and of mollifying any little acerbities and
irritations which may at present exist between them." Russell, Diary, July S,
1861.
' Vol. m. 429.
1

i
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being abdicated all sanity of judgment. Confident of an early
and decisive military success, both the Secretary of State and
the community at large were disposing in advance of the spoils
and captives. The Secretary was, also, in the way natural to
him, arranging a diplomatic program in which scant, if any,
consideration was to be shown foreign nations. In other words,
he was preparing a theatrical appeal to that spirit of American
nationality in the might of which he had such implicit, if somewhat sentimental, faith.
Such then, so far as the evidence warrants conclusions, was
the attitude of Mr. Seward, and such the policy he strove to
impose. That policy was, it would also appear, based on several
propositions almost equally erroneous. First, he quite misapprehended the situation as respected his chieftaincy in the
conduct of the administration, and responsibility therefor.
Second, he labored under a delusion as to the feeling existing in
the community composing the Confederacy. Third, and most
dangerous of all, was his deception connected with the question of privateering as a weapon in modern warfare, whether
in the hands of the Confederacy as against the Union, or in the
hands of the national government as against foreign nations,
especially this last. As already more than once pointed out,
Seward seems to have really believed that it was but necessary
for the United States, as representative of democracy, to raise
its hand, to cause, as he himself was wont to express it, "the
world to be wrapped in fire."
.
That it should have been possible for a representative New
York politician to indulge in good faith in such a degree of infatuation hitherto has constituted, and will probably long continue to constitute, an historical enigma. That it was in his
case a passing delusion is true; as also that in its more publicly
dangerous form it did not survive the shock of July 21st.
Meanwhile, during the period of obsession, so to speak, the
danger of privateering and the use of privateering seem to have
been always present to the Secretary's mind. It was privateering, moreover, of the type of fifty years before, - that in vogue
in his youth, during the War of 1812. Accordingly, in his despatch of the 21st of May, he wrote to Mr. Adams that "Happily, Her Britannic Majesty's Government can avoid all these
difficulties. It invited us in 1856 to accede to the Declaration
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of Paris, of which body Great Britain was herself a member,
abolishing privateering everywhere in all cases and forever."
He then suggests a negotiation, saying that Mr. Adams already
had authority to propose the accession of the United States to
the Paris Declaration, and inviting him to negotiate to that
end.1
The trouble with Mr. Seward's subsequent position was
simple, - it was impossible! He wished to do, and yet not to
do. He wanted to commit the insurgents as included in the
sovereignty of the United States, but not to commit the United
States, in case of hostilities with European powers growing
out of the existing complications. He could not bring himself
to admit that a blockade conducted under the rules of international law was impossible except as an act of belligerency,
and that belligerency implied two parties to it. This necessary
and inevitable proposition both of logic and international
usage he obstinately refused to admit. In other words, so far
as accession to the Declaration of Paris was concerned, Mr.
Seward during the period in question seems mentally to have
exerted himself to the extent of self-persuasion that the conflict
in which the country was engaged was a war so far as the United
States was concerned, and a war or not a war so far as the
foreign powers were concerned, as the interest of the United
States might dictate. Moreover, he confidently maintained it
was a war conducted in accordance with established international usage, to which so far as foreign nations were affected
there was but a single party, - that party representing absolute sovereignty, while, under some rule vaguely alluded to as
in existence, the insurrectionary power was composed not of
belligerents but solely of bandits and pirates - outlaws.
That he might possibly have succeeded in this diplomatic
tour de force, had the United States forces achieved a decisive
and brilliant success at Bull Run, is within the range of possibilities. In view of what actually occurred, this possibility is,
however, hardly worthy of consideration. It is sufficient here
to say that the policy of Mr. Seward during the three months
in question, so far as the actual record shows, was based on
misapprehension; misapprehension not less of the position he
himself occupied than of the situation as it existed both in the
1 Nicolay and Hay, IV. 273.
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Confederacy and in Europe. Moreover, his contentions were
quite devoid of any foundation in the accepted principles of
international law. Somewhat transparent, the carrying of his
scheme into actual operation would almost necessarily have
resulted in a practical challenge of foreign nations at once to
recognize the Confederacy as a member of the family of
nations. It is difficult indeed to see how it could well have
failed so to do. Ill-advised, illogical, and contradictory, the
diplomatic policy pursued during this brief and early stage of
the Civil War constitutes almost as complete an enigma now
as it did to :fy!r. Adams then, or thirty years later to Mr.
Rhodes. In many aspects it is, and is likely to remain, impossible of satisfactory explanation for the simple reason that
it is incomprehensible.
Thus, in the outcome of this inquiry, I find myself back at the
point of commencement. As a diplomatic episode, the abortive
negotiation over the accession of the United States to the
articles of the Declaration of Paris bore a strong family resemblance to the equally abortive though far more disgraceful and calamitous military performance known as the first
Manassas advance. Both were ill-considered incidents, in no
respect creditable, characteristic of a distinct because a dangerously emotional period in the history of the American people,
- that is, the hundred days between Fort Sumter and Bull
Run.

